Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s interview with Radio Rossii network, Moscow, November 19, 2015

Question: Mr Lavrov, thank you for finding the time for this interview. Our first question concerns, logically, recent events and mainly the tragedy in France. Has this simplified your relations with your foreign colleagues? Has it helped overcome some differences? And, most importantly, do the statements made in the key capitals mean that they get it, or would this be a premature conclusion?

Sergey Lavrov: I think we have started receiving answers to the question that President Putin asked at the recent UN General Assembly: “Do you at least realize now what you’ve done?” With regard to Syria, our colleagues’ reaction is changing after the main part of the UN General Assembly’s session, which was attended by the heads of state and government and foreign ministers. We sensed this in the enthusiasm for our idea of holding full-scale multilateral talks on Syria.

Until recently, our Western colleagues did not want to create an inclusive group of external players, although all countries that influence the situation in Syria should be represented at any such meeting. However, the International Syria Support Group, which comprises Syria’s neighbours and all other countries that can influence the situation, has met twice over the past month. That two consensus documents based on the principles that Russia has consistently advocated since the start of the Syrian crisis were adopted on October 30 and November 14, shows that our Western partners have accepted the ineffectiveness if their previous policy, under which Bashar al-Assad’s resignation was the precondition for settling the crisis. Moreover, their recent philosophy included the following element.

When we started the air operation in Syria at President al-Assad’s request, we informed Washington that, although the US-led coalition has been operating in Syria without the approval of the legitimate government or a UN Security Council mandate (unlike in Iraq, where they have this approval), and although the US and its NATO partners and other coalition members did not have an appropriate legal framework for their operation, we were willing to coordinate our efforts with them in the interests of fighting terrorism. We proposed very tight interaction. As you know, our American partners only agreed to sign a deal to avoid accidents between US and Russian aircraft in Syrian air space. Until recently, they insisted that coordination in the fight against ISIS, an organization that’s banned in Russia, depended on the exact date of Bashar al-Assad stepping down.

Al-Assad has been called a “one-man super-magnet for terrorism.” But according to this logic, it’s not only al-Assad but also Lebanon, Turkey, France and Egypt that attract ISIS. Considering that France and Turkey advocated al-Assad’s immediate resignation especially strongly, there is no logic in the assumption that ISIS will back off as soon as al-Assad resigns, because ISIS has been working to create a so-called caliphate irrespective of Syrian developments or attitudes towards al-Assad. I believe that the French President Francois Hollande’s phone call to President Putin after the horrible terrorist attacks in Paris, during which he proposed that we coordinate our efforts, and President Putin’s agreement to do this through an alliance show that prudent politicians have abandoned arguments of secondary importance and have focused on the need to address the key priority, which is to stop ISIS’ attempts to take hold of vast territories around the world.

Question: Mr Lavrov, you’ve actually answered my next question. Many listeners remember that Russia only started actively helping Syria in the past two or three months, and ask why we didn’t do it before, for example, a year ago. Why, indeed?

Sergey Lavrov: We’ve always advocated a peaceful solution to this conflict. We did this when it began. We did it after the first armed clashes between the protesters, whose demands were mostly justified and understandable, and the Syrian government, whose belated actions didn’t satisfy the protesters. We did this when an internal, or non-international armed conflict began there, and we soon managed to convene a conference in Geneva where a communique was adopted, urging the government and the opposition to start talks based on mutual accord. The conflicting parties were urged to search for a way to reform the state while preserving its institutions and expanding opportunities for all ethnic groups and confessions. This was in June 2012.

We also took the Geneva Communique to the UN Security Council in the hope that it would be approved there too, and that appropriate action would be taken to convince the Syrian sides to launch talks. But our Western partners in the Security Council told us they wouldn’t approve the Geneva Communique, even though they helped write it. They said that the principles in the communique coordinated on the basis of consensus should be complemented with the demand for al-Assad’s resignation and immediate sanctions against his government. Nothing of this kind was discussed in Geneva, where our Western colleagues participated in coordinating the communique. For a long time after that, they lobbied at the UN Security Council for a resolution that would allow them to use force to overthrow the Syrian government. Russia and China several times used their right of veto. The resolution was not adopted. Our Western partners claimed that al-Assad must resign, otherwise the people’s suffering would increase. Before that, they claimed that his days were numbered, but this was four years ago. Our Western and other colleagues predicted that the people would rise to overthrow al-Assad, but these predictions have not come true. This can only mean that al-Assad represents the interests of a considerable part of Syrian society, and so no peaceful solution can be found to the Syrian crisis without him.

While our Western colleagues and some of their friends in the region evaded the political process, terrorists, extremists and foreign fighters flooded the region in an attempt to overthrow the Syrian government. There came a time when those who had encouraged that inflow, lost control of the situation ( just as it used to happen in the past), and foreign fighters succumbed to their terrorist instincts. They saw a chance to implement the idea, which ISIS had been nurturing since its establishment in the mid-2000s by those who were released from US prisons in Iraq and Afghanistan. Our foreign partners have lost control of the process, which started acting independently and has since conquered large territories, including world cultural heritage sites. The terrorists are selling or destroying these monuments of history and the artefacts they found there. They have seized oil fields and are selling oil in commercial amounts.

We provided this information during President Putin’s meeting with his colleagues on the sidelines of the G20 summit in Antalya. They must have seen that the terrorist threat is like a genie: once out of the bottle, it’s impossible to put back. The United States created a coalition to fight ISIS and its allies by signing a deal with Iraq more than a year ago, but it didn’t try to come to an agreement with Syria. This explains the duality of its operation, when the fight against ISIS, which has occupied large parts of Iraq and Syria, is based on two different frameworks. One framework is international law that is applied to strikes at targets in Iraq, while the strikes against Syria are delivered contrary to law.

However, we believe that we need to cooperate. We have watched the coalition trying to do this for nearly 18 months and concluded that its operations did not fully comply with the proclaimed goal of preventing the proliferation of ISIS, which has increased the territory under its control. Certain achievements have been gained in Iraq, where ISIS has been stopped in some regions. But generally, the territory of the so-called caliphate, which ISIS wants to create in Iraq and Syria, has increased, and ISIS was approaching Damascus and other large Syrian cities.

The situation was dramatic, and could end in what our Western partners wanted to avoid, judging by their statements. When we asked if they wanted to overthrow al-Assad and give Syria over to the terrorists, they replied: “Absolutely not. We need a solution under which al-Assad will leave, while the terrorists don’t seize power.” But the terrorists’ ability to seize power has been strengthened by many processes, including a brake on political talks and the strange war of the US-led coalition against terror. As I said, ISIS, Jabhat al-Nusra and their allies were standing at the doors of Damascus and other large cities. When President Bashar al-Assad sent an official request [for help] to us, we responded immediately. We are working in Syria legitimately, and we are willing to cooperate with the coalition members who are willing to, based on respect for Syria’s sovereignty and the authority of its government. I believe that suitable forms of cooperation can be found with a pragmatic approach.

Question: Mr Lavrov, President Putin said that he would act within the provisions of Article 51. What is this article about?

Sergey Lavrov: Article 51 of the UN Charter stipulates the right of any state to defend itself when it, or its citizens, come under attack. Of course, there are jurists who take a legalistic approach to this issue. I have already heard some of them voicing their opinion. However, the terrorist attack against the Russian aircraft cannot be considered separately.

This act of terrorism is a crime in a series of such horrible acts, which terrorists carried out in Lebanon, Egypt, Paris, Ankara, Baghdad, and other Iraqi cities. It is without a doubt a real threat to international peace and security. In such situations, states must exercise their right to self-defence, which is set out in the UN Charter. I am convinced that in this situation it is absolutely necessary to adopt a UN Security Council resolution which would enshrine the need to act in accordance with Chapter 7 and to do everything to quell ISIS, just as we did with regard to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. By the way, in late September we submitted a draft resolution calling everyone to unite in order to fight ISIS and other terrorists in the Middle East and North Africa. President Putin announced this initiative in his address to the UN General Assembly. The next day, we organised a ministerial meeting of the UN Security Council, where this draft resolution was handed out to meeting participants. Our Western partners told us that they are not particularly happy with the provision that anti-terrorist operations must be coordinated with the states on whose territories such operations are carried out. Therefore, they put our draft resolution on ice. We decided not to insist on it. Why force a closed door? But we were convinced that this resolution would be of need some day. Unfortunately, we were right. Again, we see willingness to unite on the anti-terror platform only after a series of tragedies. I hope there will be no more such tragedies, God forbid, although there are no guarantees, and we will be proactive from now on. Terrorists do not argue with each other. Conversely, Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS find common language perfectly well. I am sure that they can come to terms with other al-Qaeda’s branches as well. Our data show that they are good at that. In the face of such a colossal and unprecedented threat, it is unforgivable to continue to dally and put forward preconditions, such as regime change in a particular country, in order to consolidate our actions in fighting terrorism. Returning to the subject, which I already touched upon, when our Western partners say, “Let’s resolve the Bashar al-Assad problem, and then go ahead and organise effective coordination of our actions to suppress ISIS.” By that logic, al-Assad is against ISIS, if he should be removed before we can deal with ISIS. Or ISIS is against al-Assad. If so, by weakening President Bashar al-Assad, we play into the hands of ISIS.

Secretary of State John Kerry keeps telling me, and recently said it publicly, that if al-Assad goes, effective coordination will be possible. This means that by weakening al-Assad, we are strengthening ISIS. I think that everyone is beginning to realise the need for more pragmatic approaches, which is manifested in the Vienna meetings, which I mentioned earlier, and in a decisive, large-scale, major political step by President Hollande, who offered to put all differences on other issues aside and create an anti-terrorist coalition. This is fully in line with the initiative put forward by President Putin, when he spoke at the UN General Assembly and proposed creating a broad-based anti-terrorist front.

Question: Mr Lavrov, since relations with some Western countries became complicated, the concept known as the Iron Curtain has come back into use. At least, many of my Western colleagues often use the phrase. Is this indeed the case? What is the Iron Curtain? Who does it separate from whom?

Sergey Lavrov: You may recall that the term was first used in British Prime Minister Winston Churchill’s speech in March 1946. Less than a year after the end of WWII, different winds had started blowing in the West. The Hitler problem, which could not have been dealt with without Soviet Union’s participation, was resolved, Nazism was smashed, all Third Reich perpetrators were convicted by the Nuremburg Tribunal, Germany and Japan were occupied and World War II ended in complete victory. However, it so happened that our Western partners, primarily Anglo-Saxons, apparently did not need Soviet services anymore.

War is merely an extension of politics by other means. This is how a new political objective appeared: namely, the isolation of the USSR, blocking its influence in Europe, as well as in the world as a whole. Geopolitics immediately took centre stage. Then NATO came about. Of course, the Soviet Union responded to that; it responded in different ways, but still, the Soviet Union preferred cooperation.

In 1954, the USSR proposed signing an all-European collective security treaty with all countries in the region regardless of their social, economic or political systems. The proposal was rejected. The course was set towards the consolidation of pro-Western forces within the framework of NATO. Then the USSR began to respond not so much by diplomatic as by concrete military and other methods, including the building of the Berlin Wall, which, in material and symbolic terms, perhaps comes closest to the concept of an Iron Curtain.

Today, when they talk about the return of the Cold War era and in this context refer to the Iron Curtain, this is probably dictated by the vociferous statements that are occasionally heard, to the effect that Russia should be isolated. Isolation goes along with some “iron curtain”. However, the world today is a different place. If they attempt to drop an “iron curtain” in the era of globalisation and mutual understanding, they may accidentally get some part of their body pinched as a result. Sanctions and our measures in response to them are a good illustration of “cutting off your nose to spite your face.” There have been a lot of such metaphoric descriptions of the situation. So what is really important is what takes place in reality, not what politicians say as they try to prove the effectiveness of a particular one-sided line. We are not aware of any Russian isolation.

When we meet, each of our Western partners – from the Americans to the Germans to the French and to the smallest countries in Europe – ask us without fail when we are going to implement the Minsk agreements on Ukraine. Nobody asks us about Crimea. First, we explain the real situation to them, how things are on the ground. Second, as of late, they have themselves started complaining that, unfortunately, Kiev has been unable to do what it promised by signing the Minsk agreements. Then comes a litany of reasons: because they are facing an opposition, radical forces, a very complicated internal political situation and they also have to rescue the economy and fight corruption, and then the recent elections did not go the way some people wanted them to go. In other words, there is a growing realisation that the Minsk agreements should be honoured above all by Kiev and Donbass, not by Russia. This comes out in the Normandy format, whatever Kiev might say about it. In its public comments, Kiev constantly tries to turn everything upside down, claiming that the West completely endorses its behaviour. The West does not completely endorse its behaviour. The time that has passed since the coup has not passed in vain for serious Western politicians. They are beginning to reappraise the situation, realising where they have ended up in connection with the Ukraine crisis.

Our Western partners have frozen some of our formats, for example, the Russia-NATO Council; sectoral dialogues with the EU have been frozen; in some instances, the work of intergovernmental commissions on trade and economic cooperation has been frozen, but this process is already returning to a normal mode, and these mechanisms are resuming operation. Some other formats have been suspended, but daily contacts have not stopped. None of our delegations is aware of any isolation at any event wherever we go: on a presidential visit, at the ministerial level or the level of heads of other agencies. At any forum, the Russian delegation is in the focus of attention. They consult with us and they ask us to back a particular initiative on the agenda. I’m sure that these attempts were doomed to fail from the outset and now everyone understands that it is even ridiculous to talk about that.

Question: We remember how in Soviet times, it was customary to divide countries into our friends and enemies. Is that approach still practiced today?

Sergey Lavrov: This is absolutely unacceptable for us. President Putin has repeatedly mentioned that we are not looking for enemies, have never done so, and will never do so. Most countries have a position of their own on everything, because there can be no unanimity in all things. There can be no discipline of the rod, although there are attempts to impose it in NATO and the EU, but to no avail. As soon as problems arise that are the slightest bit serious, such as refugees, national specifics immediately manifest themselves, and things will always be that way. Even the closest allies cannot see eye to eye on all things, so diplomacy should focus on achieving compromise solutions. When our Western partners put forward a slogan, such as “either with us or against us,” addressing it to our neighbours, including countries of the former Soviet Union, it actually represents a thinly veiled attempt to turn someone into an enemy.

NATO is actively searching for an enemy, because after the failure of the Afghan campaign, they resumed their search for their raison d'être. After Afghanistan, the morale in NATO went down, as they started rationalising whether they should have gone there at all, and what they are going to do now. Then came a sudden coup in Ukraine, with loud statements about banning the Russian language, and Russians not being welcome in Crimea. These developments received a proper response, which triggered speculations about self-determination of the Crimean people.

They are now busy fashioning an enemy out of our country. We do not engage in such matters. On the contrary, we confirm our proposal that I mentioned earlier: in 1954, there was a proposal to sign a pan-European treaty on collective security. In 2008, we renewed this initiative and updated it to fit the current realities and proposed signing a treaty on Euro-Atlantic security, now meaning not only Europe, but North America as well. It also got filibustered, but its underlying principles – ensuring equal and indivisible security when no state will ensure its own security at the expense of others – remain absolutely relevant. Moreover, they are enshrined in the political declarations of the OSCE and the Russia-NATO Council, when it was created. However, when we suggested translating political principles, stating that no one should infringe on the security of another state, into a legally binding language, our Western partners immediately began to drop their commitments made at the top political level.

NATO is building up its presence in terms of military equipment and heavy weapons on the border with Russia in violation of the Founding Act, which states that such forces will not be deployed on the territory of new members on a permanent basis. They are trying to get around it using petty tricks, telling us that these are “not permanent forces, but a rotation.” What’s the difference, if a fully equipped brigade, armed to the teeth, will replace another brigade every six months? This will not improve stability. It all fits into the logic of searching for an enemy, so as to be able to start working on expanding geopolitical space in a more intensive manner. New members were admitted to NATO, but they promised that no substantial combat forces would be deployed on their territories. Now, they can say: “You see, it won’t be a permanent deployment, but rather a rotated deployment. This needs to be done, because of the Russian aggression, Crimea, and so on and so forth”.

The same logic can be seen in the actions and the positions adopted by certain Western countries. I’ve already cited the example of a slogan that they put forward in relation to our neighbours, “either with us (Europe and the West), or against us.” It was a public, in-your-face statement made during the first Ukrainian crisis of 2003–2004. Recently, the EU bureaucrats have joined this campaign, as they were developing an Association Agreement with Ukraine, which, as you may be aware, was at odds with Ukraine’s obligations regarding the free trade area within the CIS. Back then, our clarifying statements to the president and prime minister of Ukraine made them take a break and consider how to combine their existing CIS commitments and the obligations that they planned to assume in their relations with the EU. This became a formal reason, a trigger for the Maidan protests, which were absolutely illegitimate, and violated every provision of the rule of law, etc.

It’s the same principle at play here: with us or against us. That is what they are doing now in Moldova, and also what they tried to do in Armenia. I am convinced that there is absolutely no need to make such “either-or” statements. Our proposals, which we provided about a year ago for consideration by the Ukrainian side and the European Commission, contain practical and feasible ideas about how Ukraine can move towards creating a free trade area with the EU and, at the same time, honour its obligations under the CIS free trade area agreement. It is necessary to establish certain periods and phases in this work to equalise tariffs, customs, phytosanitary, regulatory and other requirements. At least, it would allow us (I hope that not everything is completely lost, but chances are slim) to avoid the destruction of trade space in the EU, the Eurasian Economic Union and the CIS free trade area. No way, they just don’t want this. There’s just one answer: “We have made all the decisions, go ahead and join us, and then we'll see. In the unlikely event that you feel uncomfortable, maybe we can work something else out.” You see, they’ve decided everything for us, although the issue directly concerns our major trading partner. Just like in the area of security – everything was decided for us regarding the missile defence system. All our efforts to develop a concept of missile defence in conjunction with the Americans and the Europeans were rejected. We were just told, “The missile defence architecture has been agreed upon, everything is fine, it is not directed against you, so join us and see for yourself that everything is all right.” It's a bit rude, at least with regard to our intellectual abilities. From the perspective of practical politics, it takes us away from cooperation and coordination of our efforts on major issues, such as terrorism, organised crime and violent extremism.

To be continued...