Deputy Foreign Minister Andrey Rudenko’s interview with Sputnik News Agency, December 27, 2021

Question: Recent events in the post-Soviet space are having an impact on Russia’s interests. They include problems on the Belarus-Poland border, clashes in Karabakh, a gas crisis in Moldova, protest rallies in Georgia and NATO’s increased activity near the Russian border. Is it a long-term trend? What will be Russia’s response, and what role could the CIS play in resolving these problems?

Andrey Rudenko: Any significant events and processes in the post-Soviet space have an impact on Russia’s interests in one way or another, because they concern our closest neighbours. We attach priority attention to stability and sustainable development in the region. Regrettably, not everyone is happy with this, and some countries have been trying to provoke the disintegration of the CIS in order to break Russia’s ties with its traditional allies.

Continued attempts have been made in the West over the past years to interfere in the internal affairs of the CIS member states. In addition to your examples, I can mention the nearly complete transition to external management in Ukraine, open support for non-registered opposition in Belarus designed to carry out a colour revolution in the republic, and US attempts to deploy a military structure in Central Asia under the pretext of aggravation in Afghanistan. We have taken note of increased military-biological activities in the post-Soviet space, supposedly to counter the pandemic, and the involvement of CIS states in NATO’s anti-Russia provocations, including in the areas that directly border on the Russian Federation. This list goes on and on.

Of course, the issues of global security and stability are always on the CIS agenda. During their meetings, our heads of state and government, as well as our foreign ministers, thoroughly and openly discuss crises in various countries and interstate differences, including those that have been provoked and are being stoked by external forces. This is extremely important. Overall, our CIS partners have a sober view on the situation and the real motives of the United States and other Western countries, and most of them are critical of the practice of sanctions, political pressure and the enforcement of alien values.

We must not only prevent the weakening of our traditional allied relations with the CIS states, but we should also provide comprehensive support to strengthening them in various fields. Unlike NATO or the EU, there is no practice of enforcing decisions that contradict national interests in the CIS. We stand for an equal and substantive dialogue on any issues, including those that may be sensitive for Russia.

The Commonwealth of Independent States, which marked its 30th anniversary in 2021, has proved its viability as a diversified regional organisation and a popular platform for a multifaceted dialogue. We will continue working to improve its operations, promote industry-specific cooperation and increase the effect of CIS cooperation.

Question: Belarus is preparing to vote in a referendum on constitutional reform in February 2022. It is obvious that the reform will be followed by a new presidential election. What are Russia’s expectations regarding this political transformation?

Andrey Rudenko: Constitutional reform is Belarus’ internal affair, and the same applies to setting the date for a new presidential election. Stability in internal affairs and prosperity in a country that is Russia’s ally is something we are interested in, in all sincerity. We do see that the Belarusian authorities are doing everything they can to consolidate society and meet the demand expressed by some of its people to give the republic an updated governance framework. The drafting of constitutional amendments has been a transparent and inclusive process involving various social groups, including opposition forces with a constructive agenda. Moreover, a large-scale effort to hold public hearings will precede the vote on the amendments.

We are certain that the constitutional referendum will take place in a transparent manner and without any provocations. Russia will accept any result it delivers. Only the people of this country have the right to trace the development path for their state, which must be done independently and without any outside pressure. Only the Belarusian citizens can decide when to hold a new presidential election in Belarus.

As for our expectations, we hope that a strengthened statehood, lasting stability in domestic affairs and better wellbeing for the people will be the main outcomes of the political transformation Belarus has embarked upon. We will always be there “to lend our shoulder,” if need may be, to our brotherly republic, with which we have been building a Union State, acting diligently and in the spirit of equality and deep mutual respect.

Question: What are the chances of the 3+3 Platform emerging as an effective format? How important is Georgia’s involvement in it, considering that so far it has been refusing to contribute to this regional project? Can the 3+3 Platform operate as a 3+2 framework, without Georgia, at least at the initial stages?

Andrey Rudenko: The 3+3 regional consultative platform has been created and already operates as a pragmatic, politics-free format seeking to bring South Caucasus countries and their neighbours closer together. In our joint efforts, we are focusing on matters of shared interest and on confidence-building measures such as promoting trade, economic, transport, cultural and humanitarian ties, as well as fighting common challenges and threats. Held in Moscow on December 10, 2021, the first 3+3 meeting showed that the participants are interested not only in maintaining constructive dialogue, but also in promoting cooperation on practical matters.

We regret that Tbilisi did not send its representatives to attend the first meeting despite all the benefits that participation in the Platform’s work could bring this country. In fact, all the participants said they were interested in having Georgia among them, and agreed to leave the door open for this country.

Question: Were there any discussions with Russia’s Central Asian partners on the risks related to a possible inflow of refugees from Afghanistan? Has there been any talk of undertaking any joint action to prevent the terrorist threat from spilling over from Afghanistan with its extreme instability?

Andrey Rudenko: Of course, this issue is on the agenda of our contacts with our Central Asian partners, and calls for a comprehensive solution. Much will depend on how the situation unfolds in Afghanistan itself, and whether we can spare this country a humanitarian disaster by working together. We contribute to resolving this issue and provide direct assistance to the people of Afghanistan, as well as seek to rally international support, among other things, to unblock the funds of the Afghan government in foreign banks. On the other hand, we have a clear understanding that there could be terrorists among the refugees heading to neighbouring countries. With this in mind, we are working with the countries neighbouring Afghanistan to take preventive measures, share information and hold joint exercises and manoeuvres, as well as supply equipment, military products, special gear and vehicles with the primary objective of securing the borders. Let me also note that our Central Asian partners have been living side-by-side with Afghanistan for many centuries now, and understand how to build their relations with this country better than many of us do. They proceed from their own security and development agendas, as well as building on the traditional links they share with their kindred communities on the other side of the border. We understand this. Our objective is to coordinate steps in the common interests. We need to overcome Afghanistan’s internal crisis and prevent threats from spilling over in a way that brings them closer to our country.

Question: Have any positive changes in Russia-Moldova relations emerged following the visit to Moscow by Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs and European Integration of the Republic of Moldova Nicolae Popescu? And did the parties discuss preparations for a visit to Moscow by President of Moldova Maia Sandu?

Andrey Rudenko: After a certain pause, caused by electoral processes in Moldova, we can say that the political dialogue with Chisinau is being restored. Our bilateral contacts are becoming regular and steady.

In August 2021, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Presidential Executive Office Dmitry Kozak visited Chisinau. In October 2021, deputy prime ministers of Moldova Vladislav Kulminsky and Andrey Spinu visited Moscow. Federation Council Speaker Valentina Matviyenko had a meeting with Speaker of the Moldovan Parliament Igor Grosu in Athens.

On November 17, 2021, during Nicolae Popescu’s visit to Russia, the parties signed a joint statement by the foreign ministers in connection with the 20th anniversary of the bilateral Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation of 2001 and the plan of consultations between the foreign ministries for 2022-2023. Nicolae Popescu and Russian Minister of Agriculture Dmitry Patrushev, the co-chairs of the Intergovernmental Commission for Economic Cooperation, also held a meeting. It was agreed to hold the commission’s 17th meeting in the first quarter of 2022, and preparations for it are now underway. Our countries’ foreign ministries also continue to maintain contacts.

We highly value Moldovan leaders’ striving to maintain constructive and pragmatic cooperation with Russia aimed at resolving open matters. At the same time, we hope that these statements by Moldova will be backed by practical steps. In turn, we are ready to continue such interaction in line with the principles of pragmatism and consideration for each other’s interests.

A for the possibility of President of the Republic of Moldova Maia Sandu visiting Russia, the Russian side has repeatedly commented on it, including after recent talks with Nicolae Popescu in Moscow. It will be possible to talk about such visit after a content-rich and detailed agenda is formulated.

Question: Can we expect an official meeting in the 5+2 format to take place any time soon? It has been idle for two years now. Has there been any practical talk of withdrawing the Operational Group of Russian Forces from Transnistria or removing the ammunition depots?

Andrey Rudenko: It is true that the past two years were challenging times for the Transnistria settlement process. In fact, the last official meeting in the 5+2 negotiating format took place in October 2019, in Bratislava. Several reasons explain this pause, including the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as the processes in Moldova’s domestic politics.

In 2021, Russia, as well as other mediators and observers involved in the 5+2 format went to great lengths to prepare and hold a regular meeting before the end of the year. There was a real opportunity for this to happen, but it never materialised due to Moldova’s position. Chisinau arguably has the most to gain from ensuring that the settlement process moves forward and reviving the 5+2 format. However, it seems that other arguments prevailed.

As a guarantor country and a mediator in the negotiating process, as well as in our bilateral contacts, we have been calling on Chisinau and Tiraspol to step up their dialogue on the Transnistria settlement, including in the 5+2 format. We stand for reviving the proper functioning of this mechanism and convening its meeting, which has been long overdue. There is political will in Tiraspol to move in this direction.

As for the Operational Group of Russian Forces on the left bank of the Dniester, it has a clear mandate. The Operational Group of Russian Forces primarily serves the Russian peacekeeping group as part of the Joint Peacekeeping Forces. The peacekeeping mission is far from exhausting its mandate, which is closely linked to achieving political agreements on ways to settle the conflict. Achieving this objective remains a very distant opportunity.

The other reason for the presence of the Operational Group of Russian Forces in Transnistria is the need to secure the ammunition depots. This is our responsibility and no one else’s. We do not intend to back away from our obligations to remove and destroy this property, and stand ready to discuss practical steps to this effect with Moldova.

Question: Over the past year, Russia has actively assisted the CIS countries in their coronavirus response efforts. Now we are heading into a new wave, the Omicron variant. Do you plan to coordinate actions and further develop cooperation in this area?

Andrey Rudenko: Our lives have been dominated by fighting the Covid-19 pandemic for almost two years. This new reality is apparently here to stay – new strains keep being discovered in various regions of the world, and the number of cases, unfortunately, is not decreasing much.

However, paradoxically, while looking for answers to respond to this serious challenge, we have also managed to find resources for growth and development. I am primarily referring to the profound digitalisation of various spheres of human activity, and the exchange of the most up-to-date biomedical technologies.

As for the CIS countries, we believe it is of the essence to preserve the common sanitary and epidemiological space. Russia is ready to play its role in this process. That is why we continue to provide comprehensive assistance to our CIS friends in responding to Covid-19. Mutual support and mutual assistance in a difficult situation is natural and normal. This is what characterises very close friends and allies who have lived side by side for centuries.

Since the onset of the pandemic, we have delivered more than 100,000 vaccine doses, a large number of test systems, medicines, personal protective equipment, mobile diagnostic systems and innovative microbiological laboratories to the CIS countries. The Healthcare Ministry, the Ministry of Defence and Rospotrebnadzor dispatch Russian medical specialists to the CIS countries to provide scientific and methodological support and gain their own experience.

We definitely plan to deepen the well-established substantive interaction and continue the necessary scientific and methodological support. We note the effective regular contacts between our countries’ epidemiological services, in particular, the meetings of the Coordination Board on Sanitary Protection of CIS Member Nations from the Import and Spread of Especially Dangerous Infectious Diseases. It is gratifying that the CIS legal framework is being improved.

Question: One of the major concerns of the CIS citizens is that Russia does not recognise their Sputnik V vaccine certificates from other countries (for example, a Sputnik V certificate issued by a Kazakhstani clinic). This causes problems for many migrants from CIS countries. What are the reasons for this, and is there a way to resolve the problem?

Andrey Rudenko: I would like to start with the fact that Russia’s Sputnik V is widely used in absolutely all CIS countries, except perhaps Ukraine; it enjoys trust and, accordingly, demand among the local population. I have already mentioned Russia’s supplies, hundreds of thousands of doses of the first and second components. Licenced manufacturing of Sputnik V has been launched in Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, and is under discussion with Azerbaijan. I believe that this is a great victory for our national science, including in the international context. We are implementing a joint innovation and IT project, the Travelling without Covid-19 app, to help restore public mobility during the pandemic. All EAEU countries and most of our CIS partners are involved in it.

The Government of the Russian Federation is currently coordinating an extensive effort to accelerate the international recognition of documents certifying immunisation with Russian vaccines, including the recognition of QR codes, with foreign states, foreign economic and political associations. A corresponding interdepartmental working group has been created, led by the Russian Healthcare Ministry. Consultations are underway with a number of countries, including Kazakhstan, on the format of the future agreement and other legal aspects.

I am confident that many citizens of Russia as well as other states, primarily the CIS countries, are looking forward to an early solution to this problem with the recognition of certificates. I would like to assure you that the Russian Foreign Ministry is doing everything in its power as well.