Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s statement and answers to media questions at a joint news conference with Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan, Yerevan, May 21, 2025

Mr Mirzoyan,

Colleagues,

I would like to once again thank our Armenian friends for the warm welcome and gracious hospitality.

Our talks are taking place in accordance with the agreements reached between President Vladimir Putin and Prime Minister of Armenia Nikol Pashinyan, who, in the autumn of 2024, came to an agreement to restore regular contacts across all areas.

In accordance with that agreement, we are holding the second ministerial meeting this year. Between our January meeting and today’s visit, consultations were held at the deputy minister level. Further ministerial contacts at various levels have been scheduled. We signed a Consultation Plan to this effect today.

I would also like to take this opportunity to once again thank our Armenian friends and personally Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan for the participation at the top level in the Victory Day events in Moscow, and for the fact that Armenia, just like the Russian Federation, cherishes and honours the sacred memory of the Great Victory.

Armenia hosted a large-scale Immortal Regiment march, a Garden of Memory campaign, and dozens of other events, including concerts dedicated to the anniversary of Victory.

We began our visit today by laying a wreath at the Eternal Flame at the Mother Armenia monument. This once again highlights our shared reverence for the achievements of freedom, independence, and justice attained through the efforts of our heroic ancestors.

We had an in-depth discussion of the status of the implementation of the agreements reached at the top level, including trade and economic cooperation, security issues, and the expansion of mutual diplomatic presence, in particular, the opening of a Russian Consulate General in Kapan, for which preparatory work is underway.

We are committed to expanding sister-city relations between the cities and municipalities of our two countries, as well as cooperation between Russian and Armenian regions. As Minister Mirzoyan noted, preparations are underway for the next interregional forum, which will further consolidate the material foundation underlying our allied and strategic partnership relations.

Thanks to these efforts, we have seen record-high bilateral trade figures, which reached an impressive $11.6 billion in 2024, accounting for over a third of Armenia’s total foreign trade. Russia remains Armenia’s number one trading and investment partner.

We noted that 96 percent of bilateral trade is conducted in national currencies, roubles and drams. Russian economic operators traditionally serve as key taxpayers and employers in Armenia and implement projects of high social importance.

We welcome the efforts of the Armenian authorities to ensure the legitimate interests of Russian businesses investing in the republic. We are confident that this will encourage additional inflows of Russian investment into key sectors of Armenia’s economy such as agriculture, energy, mining, transport, and logistics.

We highly value the work of the Russian-Armenian Intergovernmental Commission on Economic Cooperation, which operates in an unfaltering manner. Its 23rd session took place in Moscow on December 20, 2024. It is comforting to note the energetic activity of the Russian-Armenian Business Council, which unites dozens of companies from the two countries. We also noted high demand for regular visits by business missions from Russian regions to the Republic of Armenia.

Legislative ties are progressing. Our colleague Ararat Mirzoyan reported that preparations are underway for a visit by the Speaker of the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation to the Republic of Armenia. The bilateral Interparliamentary Commission on Cooperation is fully operational.

We exchanged views on bilateral cooperation within shared integration associations, primarily the EAEU. Our assessments overlap. The EAEU membership is a prerequisite for sustainable economic growth and improved standards of living of our citizens.

We discussed cooperation in security as well. We are allies. This year marks the 30th anniversary of the Russian military base in Armenia, an important component of the country’s security infrastructure. We advocate for close and regular contacts between our militaries, law enforcement agencies, and security services. All of this should build upon the vast experience accumulated over the years. We are interested in Armenia’s active involvement in the CSTO.

We discussed ways to promote objective media coverage of the developments in Russia and Armenia, as well as our countries’ positions on international and regional issues.

As part of the Consultation Plan that we signed today, we have outlined a dedicated dialogue between our foreign ministries’ information departments.

When discussing international and regional issues, we focused on the situation in our shared region, the South Caucasus. We are convinced that the issues arising here should be addressed primarily by the countries of the region and their closest neighbours.

We have nothing against non-regional countries developing relations with the countries of the South Caucasus in line with international practice, as long as it is understood that such interactions will not aim to create tensions in the region or disregard the interests of local countries for the sake of geopolitical games which have never led to positive outcomes anywhere. Our position is one of openness to cooperation with all parties that are willing to work honestly without hidden agendas.

In line with this approach, we reaffirmed Russia’s willingness to continue facilitating progress between Yerevan and Baku towards comprehensive peace and reconciliation through the conclusion of a peace treaty, the unblocking of economic and transport links, and the delimitation and demarcation of the state border. The set of 2020–2022 trilateral Russian-Armenian-Azerbaijani agreements signed at the top level remains the solid foundation underlying this process.

We see significant potential in developing the 3+3 regional cooperation platform, which brings together the three South Caucasus countries and their close neighbours Russia, Iran, and Türkiye. Two ministerial meetings have taken place in Tehran and Istanbul. We are now discussing the timeframe for holding the third ministerial forum. Following the contacts in Tehran and Istanbul, we feel cautiously optimistic about the platform’s future. It has all the makings of an important element for strengthening long-term peace and security in the region, boosting mutually beneficial trade, economic, and transport cooperation, and serving as a venue for promoting the rich cultural traditions of the South Caucasus countries and their close neighbours.

We discussed potential venues for the next 3+3 meeting. I believe Armenia and Azerbaijan that are willing to host this event can effectively come to an agreement. Russia is ready to assist in ensuring continuity in the format’s meetings. We support the idea of holding the next two events in the capitals of Armenia and Azerbaijan, respectively.

We are satisfied with the outcome of the talks. Our discussions were candid without any attempt to hide the specifics of the national stances. These specifics exist in all bilateral relations. I hope that the results of our conversation, agreements and plans that we outlined today, will be supported by President Vahagn Khachaturyan and Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, who have kindly agreed to host our delegation later today.

Question: At a regional workshop that brought together EU ambassadors in Eastern European countries, you stated that the existing security architecture was ineffective. Should Yerevan be expected, with this statement in mind, to completely forgo cooperation with Russia and the CIS countries on this matter and to start looking for new strategic partners in Europe, among other places?

Sergey Lavrov: European security concerns everyone. We share the fundamental assessment whereby the European security system as we know it has proven its ineffectiveness, and has done so in a long while and repeatedly. Euro-Atlantic entities have formed the backbone of the existing security entities. If we consider an inclusive entity, it would be the OSCE. However, if we consider an entity that, despite the creation of the Organisation, is dead set to do everything it can to maintain its dominant positions without transferring the functions of defining and implementing corresponding principles to the OSCE, but rather keeping them to itself that would be the North Atlantic Alliance.

From what we’ve seen the European Union do recently, we are also compelled to see it as part of the Euro-Atlantic construct. By signing an agreement with NATO and delegating a significant portion of its security responsibilities, the EU is concurrently engaged in its own militarisation. This framework of legacy security entities has not passed the test of durability.

As you may be aware, in 1999, at the OSCE Summit in Istanbul, a comprehensive document on indivisibility of security was adopted. It stated that no country or organisation in the OSCE region can claim dominance within the borders of the OSCE member countries. This principle was reaffirmed, word for word, at the 2010 OSCE Summit in Astana. Since then, we have sought compliance with this principle from our Western partners in light of the fact that despite all these commitments adopted and signed at the top level, they pressed on with eastward NATO expansion contrary to our repeated warnings that this created direct threats to Russia’s security and contradicted the principle of indivisible security. They told us they were committed to obligations not to reinforce their security at the expense of the security of other countries. But these are political commitments. So, we proposed codifying this “political commitment” and making it legally binding. In 2008, we circulated such a draft treaty. NATO members said that security guarantees can only be provided within the alliance. When we said their presidents signed those documents, we were told again that those were political commitments that did not carry much weight. This is how they go about documents adopted at the top level.

Since then, our North Atlantic colleagues have repeatedly demonstrated that they want to dominate and have no need for the OSCE. It is simply a front to hide their true intentions behind lofty slogans.

The next “exam” that Euro-Atlantic structures failed was the unilateral declaration of independence of Kosovo. We were told not to worry because it was about exercising the right of nations to self-determination enshrined in the UN Charter. As you may be aware, when this unilateral declaration was voiced, there were no ongoing hostilities. No one out there argued that people need to be saved. They simply decided the time was right. However, six years later, a bloody neo-Nazi coup broke out in Ukraine, and the perpetrators immediately declared a course on eradicating everything that is Russian, including education, culture, etc. They sent armed groups to Crimea to seize the Supreme Council. Crimea residents said they didn’t want any of that and would not recognise their illegal troops. When our military sailors from the Russian base in Sevastopol stood up for them and helped them hold a referendum, NATO members never mentioned the right of nations to self-determination once. They said it was a gross violation of the principle of territorial integrity. When we told them that after the “Kosovo precedent,” the UN International Court had issued a ruling stating that when a portion of a territory declares independence, this decision does not necessarily need to be coordinated with the central authorities, they did not respond to us. They simply ignored us. That is why this kind of entities indeed represents failed security mechanisms. They prove this every day, including by silently reacting to the coup in 2014, followed by the mayhem caused by the coup plotters who illegally grabbed power in Ukraine. Remember the bombing raids by combat aircraft on central Lugansk and other cities in eastern Ukraine? Remember them burning about 50 people alive in the Trade Unions House in Odessa? No one is going to conduct any investigation. The OSCE remains bashfully silent.

By the same token, they and the UN remain silent in response to our demands to show progress of investigation into the tragedy that took place in Bucha, when BBC reporters, who happened to be there conveniently, showed neatly arranged bodies on the main street of that town. We have so far been unable to obtain a list of the people whose bodies were so dramatically presented to the world. That episode was used as a pretext to impose yet another wave of sanctions on Russia. What kind of security system is that? What kind of justice is that?

The Euro-Atlantic constructs have lost credibility. It appears that the United States is becoming disillusioned with them as well. At least, the Trump administration indicated that Europe needs to take more responsibility for its own affairs. The United States has other priorities in other parts of the world.

This begs the question: what kind of security system would be a better choice to ensure justice? We believe that a more just security system would not be the one imposed from above by a single entity, but one that is based on real-life circumstances. For example, there are a number of integration associations in Eurasia: the EAEU (which we mentioned today), the CIS, the CSTO, ASEAN, and the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf. There are sub-regional organisations in South Asia as well. Many of these entities have signed memoranda of cooperation with one another. Thus, a kind of Greater Eurasian Partnership, as President Putin described it, is naturally forming from the ground up. I would add the Chinese Belt and Road initiative here, which is being implemented in conjunction with the EAEU and ASEAN. All of this forms a material foundation for future security architecture. When the economy connects nations, it always helps come to an agreement on how to overcome challenges and threats.

Therefore, the Eurasian security architecture holds a lot of promise. The doors to discussions on how to build it are open. For a couple of years now, conferences have been held in Minsk with the participation of foreign ministers, their deputies, and political scientists that are aimed at drafting a Eurasian Charter of Diversity and Multipolarity in the 21st  Century. Everyone is invited to join the dialogue, including EU members and European NATO members. This is an honest approach that involves universal coordination of the potential future constructs.

When our colleagues from the alliance, including former Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg - mindful of their interest in eastern Eurasia - were asked by journalists about NATO’s plans to move infrastructure to the Far East and the Southeast Asia, despite NATO positioning itself as a territorial defence alliance protecting territories of its member states, he said - without missing a beat - yes, that is exactly the case. But in the current circumstances, threats to NATO member states supposedly come from the South China Sea, the Taiwan Strait, Southeast Asia, and so on. In other words, NATO desires to expand its security system to the entire continent. But the alliance is willing to do so exclusively with it sitting in the driver’s seat, as it transfers its military infrastructure there and creates “mini-blocs,” “trios,” “quartets,” and the like. This is about imposing a concept that has a clear anti-Chinese slant and is aimed at containing the Russian Federation.

We have a different approach. Let’s all come together and come to agreements without imposing anything on anyone. The European Union does not yet have such military capabilities, but it is vigorously developing them and becoming militarised. We only need to point out Germany’s statement about its plans to once again become Europe’s main military power. The EU is also active in this regard and is trying to extend its mechanisms to the South Caucasus and the Central Asian region. No one can tell anyone not to develop relations with any particular country, but this should not be a zero-sum game. One cannot show up and say: we’ll let you have the project you’re interested in, but, in return, you must sever communication with someone else. We do not live by this principle. That principle has been known as “divide and conquer” since ancient times. Clearly, there is nothing democratic or free about it.

Question: In 2022, Azerbaijan launched an attack on the sovereign territory of Armenia, specifically targeting the town of Jermuk. Why did the Russian Federation fail to respond appropriately?

Sergey Lavrov: I am uncertain as to what you deem an “appropriate response.” A reaction consistent with our obligations to Armenia under the CSTO framework was indeed forthcoming. Without delay, an advanced CSTO fact-finding mission, led by the organisation’s Secretary-General, was dispatched to the site. It promptly submitted a report containing concrete, practical proposals for deploying a CSTO observer mission to stabilise the situation. The report specified the number of observers required and the armaments they were to be equipped with.

This report was reviewed in October 2022 during the CSTO summit in Yerevan. In the lead-up to the meeting of heads of state and government, foreign and defence ministers engaged in extensive deliberations, personally revising proposals drafted by the CSTO Secretariat under the chairmanship of Ararat Mirzoyan. Ultimately, we reached consensus on the full text. The agreed document was presented to the heads of state and government for consideration the following morning. However, in that instance, the Armenian side, citing various reasons, proposed postponing the adoption of the harmonised text – declaring that “no consensus exists”. We acquiesced, and in November 2022, the European Union mission was announced. In Prague, it was declared that the status of Nagorno-Karabakh – previously affirmed on a mutual basis by both Baku and Yerevan – would henceforth be resolved under the 1991 Alma-Ata Declaration, pursuant to which the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region constitutes part of Azerbaijan.

This development proved rather unexpected. Recall that in November 2020, at the height of hostilities between Azerbaijan and Armenia, President of Russia Vladimir Putin, alongside Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, personally oversaw the drafting of a ceasefire agreement late into the night. That document intentionally left aside the question of Nagorno-Karabakh’s status. It constituted a gentleman’s understanding that the region’s status would be subject to further mutual agreement between the parties.

Yet what happened, happened. I therefore do not contest our Armenian friends’ prerogative to criticise positions adopted by any party during that period. I have outlined our actions.

To foster a deeper comprehension of the situation, let us recall the decades-long negotiations conducted under previous administrations in Yerevan. On multiple occasions, agreements appeared within reach, only to subsequently collapse. Thus, criticism may be levied. Yet none criticise those who do nothing. We, for our part, endeavoured to act.

Question (retranslated from Armenian): You have come to a country against which, as well as against Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan used a large number of Russian weapons. As a result, Nagorno-Karabakh and a portion of the territory of the Republic of Armenia were captured. Moreover, Russia failed to fulfil its obligations under the 1997 treaty. It did not supply weapons to Armenia, even though the payment had been made in full. Don’t you think that, considering the circumstances, Armenia should begin military cooperation with other countries, such as France?

Even though, at the January 14 new conference, you stated that EU membership is the sovereign decision of each country. There have been warnings about Ukrainianisation of Armenia. What does this mean? Does Russia intend to pressure Armenia economically or militarily, as it did Kiev? Or, do you truly respect the decision made by sovereign Armenia?

Sergey Lavrov: Frankly, I feel uneasy answering your question, because you’re clearly not looking for an answer.

First, I didn’t memorise everything you just said, but your position is clear. I will try to respond.

With regard to Azerbaijan using Russian weapons, you may be aware that Armenia, too, has used Russian-made weapons throughout the years following its independence, specifically, to seize seven Azerbaijani districts to which it had never officially laid claim.

None of Armenia’s first leaders ever proposed recognising Nagorno-Karabakh as an independent entity. But Russian weapons were used to seize seven uncontested Azerbaijani districts and to build fortifications and defence lines there indicating a clear intent to hold those territories long-term. According to some analysts, the nature of those fortifications suggests there were no plans whatsoever to return them to Azerbaijan.

Africa has Russian weapons as well. Mozambique’s flag features a Kalashnikov assault rifle. Many countries have our weapons, but that doesn’t mean they are always used in ways that align with the principles that suit everybody.

We discussed the instances involving paid-up but undelivered arms shipments today. The issue has been settled. The payments have been reallocated for other purposes. There are no differences regarding new deliveries.

We are dealing with a situation where we are once again, as multiple times in the past, forced to fight against all of Europe, which, under Nazi slogans and using the Zelensky regime as a front, is waging war against Russia. Almost all European countries are involved. As you understand, given the circumstances, a lot of modern weapons are being sent to Ukraine, and we are compelled to respond.

I’m convinced that our Armenian friends understand that, given the circumstances, we are not always able to fulfil our obligations on time. Nevertheless, even under these circumstances, several systems that were contracted by our Armenian partners are in the process of being delivered to them. We will continue this practice going forward.

Buying weapons from other countries is not a problem. That is up to our Armenian friends. If they want to have France as a base for additional supplies, they are welcome to do so. Any another country? Fine. We are not imposing anything on anyone. Of course, it is strange to see an ally rely on weapons from a country like France, which is at the helm of the hostile camp. President Emmanuel Macron and his ministers are overflowing with hatred towards Russia. They call Russia the only problem that stands in the way of a settlement in Ukraine. Their idea of a settlement is simply an unconditional ceasefire that would last at least a month, or longer, so they can build up the Ukrainian military and let it fortify its defensive positions. These calls for an unconditional ceasefire come after several years of the EU and NATO holding a completely different position - no talks until Ukraine achieves a stronger than Russia position, and no talks until Russia suffers a “strategic defeat” - which was followed by this abrupt turnaround. Now, they are seeking a ceasefire rather than a strategic defeat to give Ukraine some room to breathe.

Politically speaking, France is acting as a hostile country. That’s why it’s up to our allies to decide where they buy their weapons, even given everything I’ve just said.

You mentioned January 14 and the right to choose. We recognise the right to choose. We still maintain a very good relationship with our Armenian friends, despite a number of problems which are probably due to misunderstanding each other’s positions.

With regard to Nagorno-Karabakh, I’ll reiterate, no one can reproach us, because over at least the past 20 years, President Vladimir Putin, President Dmitry Medvedev, and then again President Putin have promoted solutions that provided for a fair approach through peaceful talks.

Let me refresh your memory and go over what it was all about. The proposal was to return five of the seven Azerbaijani districts as a first step. As an interim stage, the Kelbajar and Lachin districts (a vast territory connecting Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh) would be preserved in their current status, while the final status of Nagorno-Karabakh would be postponed for many years. In fact, it was suggested that the issue be left to future generations to address. It is probably a better solution than what we have now, because compromise proposals that the Russian leadership had been promoting for years were turned down. The right to choose was exercised and the formula that I just mentioned was rejected.

I won’t even comment on your remark about Russia supposedly pursuing a policy of Ukrainianisation of Armenia, with the implication that we are going to do to Armenia what, as you put it, we did to Ukraine. That means you support the Nazi regime and those who burned people alive in the Trade Union House in Odessa, those who sent armed groups to storm the Crimean parliament simply because it and the people refused to support the unconstitutional coup.

I don’t remember Armenian leaders commenting on the February 2014 coup in Ukraine. Nor do I recall any Western country speaking negatively about that event. That means Armenia, even in 2014, was exercising its right to choose its position. As for our European colleagues who just before the coup acted as guarantors of an agreement between then-President Yanukovich and the opposition - when we asked them why they wouldn’t call the putschists to order, since the agreement had been guaranteed, they looked away in embarrassment and said that sometimes democracy takes unexpected turns. The same goes for the United States. They just vanished from the picture, although shortly before, then-US President Barack Obama had called President Putin and asked him not to oppose the signing of the settlement agreement that had been reached under the EU guarantees.

Speaking of the United States, in 2014 (a bit later than in February), there was an attempted coup in The Gambia. You’re someone who takes interest in the events, so look it up. There’s a statement from the US State Department about the attempted coup in The Gambia. It says the United States will never support a transfer of power through unconstitutional means. American colleagues often attend your news conferences. Ask them why it was “unacceptable” in The Gambia, but “acceptable” in Ukraine. They will probably cite “subjective circumstances.” The truth of the matter is simple: The Gambia had a government the Americans supported, while Ukraine had a president they wanted to topple and to put in their own people. That’s all there is to it.

I see no reason whatsoever to talk about Ukrainianising Armenia. Armenia is our ally, our friend. Armenia is not outlawing the Russian language, or Russian culture, nor does it strip ethnic Russians or those who simply want to speak Russian of their legal rights. Unlike Ukraine, Armenia has not adopted laws banning any of the above. We provided our Armenian friends today with a list of these laws. Nowhere - in no country - does a non-state (or any) language get banned, if that language is spoken by residents of that particular country.

We found out that the Azerbaijani language is not banned in Armenia. In Azerbaijan, including now in Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenian is not banned under the constitution, but Russian is banned in Ukraine. In Israel, Arabic is not banned. In Arab countries, Hebrew is not banned, either.

Ukraine is a unique case. We heard EU Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos saying that Ukraine had fulfilled all preliminary requirements and that EU accession talks could begin. Meanwhile, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas, and others continue to insist that Europe must support Ukraine until it wins, because Ukraine is defending European values. Does this mean that Europe now considers Nazism and the destruction of the language spoken by the majority of a country’s citizens (in this case, Ukraine) to be its values? What kind of Ukrainianisation of Armenia are we even talking about? Armenia is a civilised country.

Go ahead and publish your question. Publishing my answers is optional.