Question: What does Russia think about the idea of a new summit on Ukraine scheduled to be held in Saudi Arabia? Has Moscow received an invitation to it? Will Russia attend the next summit on Ukraine if it receives an invitation?

Mikhail Galuzin: We are aware of the Kiev regime and its Western patrons’ plans to make up for the failure of the “peace summit” held at Burgenstock Resort in Switzerland in mid-June by holding a similar event. They are even thinking of inviting Russia to it. The place for it has not been chosen so far, but geography does not matter. What matters is the essence, which is absolutely clear. They are using the same rhetoric over and over again in the hope of selling the idea of the misguided “Zelensky’s formula,” which has been worded as an ultimatum. We see open disregard for other initiatives on the settlement of the Ukrainian crisis and double-dealing. We do not accept such ultimatums, and we are not going to attend such “peace summits.”

Question: The Russian authorities have said more than once that we are ready for talks on Ukraine, but Kiev has prohibited itself from holding them. Could this situation change after the US presidential election?

Mikhail Galuzin: You have put the finger on the point regarding Ukraine’s real master who is steering the illegitimate regime, which has usurped power in the country and is obediently fulfilling its orders. That master is the United States. Washington is the main designer and beneficiary of this conflict. It was with Washington that British Prime Minister Boris Johnson coordinated his manoeuvre when he forbade Kiev to hold negotiations with Russia in April 2022 and called for the war to continue until the final victory, thereby preventing the possibility of signing a peace treaty on terms acceptable to both Ukraine and Russia.

Actually, Americans make no secret of their mercenary aspirations, which the current and former secretaries of state confirmed the other day. Antony Blinken said openly that nearly all of the new military aid package for Ukraine would be invested in the US defence industry. His predecessor, Hillary Clinton, told our pranksters Vovan and Lexus, who phoned her on behalf of Petr Poroshenko, that Biden’s re-election depended on Ukraine’s offensive and demanded that Kiev must start this suicidal counteroffensive and keep fighting. It does not look like anything much will change on the Ukrainian track after the US presidential election. In this context, Ukraine is unlikely to be ready for talks.

Question: Earlier, you said that Switzerland has lost its neutral status, which means that the Geneva discussions on the South Caucasus should be moved to another platform, which would be more acceptable to all parties. Which countries are ready to host regular meetings in this format? When can that happen?

Mikhail Galuzin: I would like to clarify at the outset that the Russian side does not question the relevance of the negotiation format itself, while at the same time being in favour of using a different host country. These are two separate issues for us. On the one hand, this negotiating platform has been useful and effective for years. It has been largely instrumental in maintaining relative calm in the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-South Ossetian border areas, curtailing the risks of escalation of tensions on the ground. On the other hand, the need to move these discussions from Geneva is dictated by objective reasons caused by Switzerland’s final loss of neutrality in the context of the Ukraine conflict. There are numerous examples of Bern’s involvement in the aggressive policies pursued by the collective West, such as joining the EU anti-Russia sanctions and acting in solidarity with the Kiev regime. These circumstances are in fact forcing us to raise the question of transferring the talks to another host country, one where the government would, firstly, refrain from any steps that could harm the interests of any of the parties to these talks, and secondly, would have sufficient experience in hosting international dialogue formats.

We consider it premature to name any specific capitals or possible dates for the move yet, since the parties are still working to achieve the consensus necessary to resolve this issue. Our allies in Abkhazia and South Ossetia are in full solidarity with Russia’s approach.

Question: Along with hosting discussions on the South Caucasus, Switzerland also represents Russia’s interests in Georgia. Considering Bern’s recent steps, will the Swiss side continue to be involved in representing Russia’s interests?

Mikhail Galuzin: Bern’s unfriendly policy towards Moscow cannot fail to affect the Swiss Confederation’s mutual representation of the respective interests of Russia and Georgia. But, as you understand, in such cases, the decision on mediation is taken with both sides’ consent.

Question: Would Moscow reinforce its border with Abkhazia following the shootout at the Psou checkpoint near the Russian-Abkhazian border?

Mikhail Galuzin: As the Foreign Ministry sees it, there is no need for additionally strengthening the state border with Abkhazia. The incident you have mentioned took place at the entrance to the Psou checkpoint in the territory of Abkhazia on June 23, which the local law enforcement authorities quickly dealt with. As far as I know, the current situation on the Russian-Abkhazian border is stable.

We believe that Abkhazia has the greatest interest in preventing such incidents because they can damage the tourist appeal for Russian holidaymakers.

I would also like to note that a large-scale renovation project is underway at the Adler international automobile checkpoint. When it is finished in late 2026, its throughput capacity will increase to 14,500 vehicles and 80,500 people a day, which will greatly simplify border crossing for our countries’ citizens and other visitors to “the land of the soul.”

Question: Has Russia defined the red lines the crossing of which would amount to Armenia’s movement closer towards NATO and US umbrella? What would Moscow do in this case?

Mikhail Galuzin: We have notified our Armenian partners of our views on this matter and openly stated them. Regarding security, I would like to emphasise that Armenia remains a CSTO member and is a party to numerous bilateral military and military-technical agreements.

Unfortunately, instead of constructively discussing its concerns, Yerevan has opted for a different approach. Armenia has decided to build up cooperation with NATO or individual members of the alliance, especially when it comes to adopting NATO standards, arms purchase or holding joint exercises, not to mention participation in the bloc’s summit currently underway in Washington. All this is extremely regrettable.

By rapidly developing cooperation with those whose goal is to inflict “strategic defeat” on Russia, Yerevan could seriously destabilise the situation in the South Caucasus, including to the detriment of its own security. I believe that experienced specialists and politicians in Armenia are aware of the potential consequences of such imprudent actions.

In my opinion, Deputy Prime Minister Alexey Overchuk spoke in no uncertain terms about the impossibility of keeping a foot in both camps at the Primakov Readings held in Moscow in late June, even though he referred to Yerevan’s economic aspirations in the EU in the context of its EAEU obligations.

Question: An EU mission has been working on the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan for 18 months. What does Moscow think about the EU’s involvement in Armenian-Azerbaijani affairs? Has it produced any practical results?

Mikhail Galuzin: We have a negative attitude to the activities of the EU mission in Armenia, as we have pointed out more than once. The EU’s apparent goal is to gain a foothold in the region to the detriment of the interests of these South Caucasus countries’ traditional partners and neighbours, such as Russia, Iran and Türkiye.

We have not seen any practical results of the EU observers’ operation. Their presence has not prevented the periodic clashes on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border. They send their reports directly to Brussels and do not even share them with Armenia. There are grounds to believe that they are collecting intelligence about Russian facilities and all Armenia’s neighbours.

We are also concerned that the EU mission is not only increasing, with Yerevan’s approval, but could eventually become a permanent body. Moreover, Canadian representatives joined the mission in April 2024, which amounts to NATO’s creeping movement into the South Caucasus.

We always raise the issue of the EU mission in our contacts with Yerevan and other regional partners. We reaffirm our belief that sustainable peace in the South Caucasus can only be established through the comprehensive implementation of the package of trilateral agreements which the leaders of Russia, Azerbaijan and Armenia reached in 2020-2022.

Question: Would Russia participate in settling the conflict between Prime Minister of Armenia Nikol Pashinyan and President of Belarus Alexander Lukashenko, which flared up after Yerevan threw accusations at Minsk and put forth its terms for resuming operations within the CSTO?

Mikhail Galuzin: Regrettably, we have no explanation for Yerevan’s harsh stand regarding our Belarusian partners. Alexander Lukashenko always highlighted his interest in stability and security in the South Caucasus. The Belarusian leader’s initiatives were aimed at reconciling the conflicting parties even in the most difficult periods.

Minsk and Yerevan are our allies, and we are developing multifaceted cooperation with them. Armenia and Belarus are members of the CIS, the CSTO and the EAEU. Moscow would like the current period of complications between our friends to end as soon as possible. Anyway, we hope that temporary differences will not affect the development of our cooperation within our common integration associations.

We urge both capitals to look beyond the horizon, to see the importance of the time when a new world order is evolving, and to understand that we would like not only Minsk but also Yerevan to take part in this process.

Question: What is the progress status on the aircraft construction projects with Minsk?

Mikhail Galuzin: Russian industrialists are interested in greater involvement of our Belarusian allies in existing Russian aircraft construction projects as well as in joint development of aircraft. This prospect fully aligns with our goals of strengthening technological sovereignty and deepening industrial cooperation within the Union State. Belarus has the required industrial base and personnel for this.

The Russian side has already established effective cooperation with Minsk Civil Aviation Plant No 407, a supplier of components for the Russian medium-haul MS-21 aircraft. Plans are in place to increase the volume of orders and expand the range of products for the MS-21 manufactured by Belarusian suppliers.

Russia and Belarus are working on a joint project to manufacture light aircraft, which are in high demand in view of an extensive network of region-to-region air routes being created to meet current market needs. Following the Moscow meeting between the prime ministers of Russia and Belarus on April 15, an intergovernmental agreement was signed on the development and joint production of the 19-seat Osvey aircraft in Belarus. In fact, Belarusian specialists have been involved in research and development on this project from day one. The plan is to roll out about 90 aircraft by 2030. The possibility of joint production and maintenance of Baikal nine-seaters is also being considered.

There is no doubt that cooperation with our Belarusian allies in aircraft manufacturing will help us achieve the import substitution objectives, replace products from unfriendly states and ultimately create safe and internationally competitive aviation equipment.

Question: Are there any news on the project to develop a Belarusian port in the Murmansk Region to tranship Belarusian goods?

Mikhail Galuzin: Thanks to the joint decisions made, we have significantly increased the volume of transit of Belarusian goods to third countries. Last year, 15.5 million tonnes of Belarusian petroleum products and potash fertilisers alone were shipped to foreign buyers across Russia’s territory. The total volume of Belarusian goods traffic via Russia exceeded 20 million tonnes.

In this situation, Belarus’s proposal to build its own multipurpose terminal in the port of Lavna in the Murmansk Region was met with support by the Russian leadership. Our Belarusian friends are contemplating considerable investment in this high-potential project, which is going to give them access to the transhipment of containers, mineral fertilisers and oil products using the Northern Sea Route.

It is obvious that our Belarusian partners’ interest in having their own port facilities in the Murmansk Region stems from a prior successful initiative in this area, the acquisition of Port Bronka, a deep-water sea terminal within the Big Port of St Petersburg. In 2023 alone, the volume of transhipment of Belarusian goods there reached 4.3 million tonnes, and this year’s plan is to tranship 6 million tonnes.

Without a doubt, the development of transport and logistics infrastructure in Russia meets our common interests.

Question: President of Russia Vladimir Putin has announced Moscow and Minsk’s plan to abolish mobile roaming across the Union State territory. When can this happen? Can we expect it this year?

Mikhail Galuzin: Indeed, we believe it is important to expedite the cancellation of roaming charges in the Union State. We are confident that this decision will spur on tourism and people-to-people contacts.

We have achieved a great deal on this track to date. In November 2020, roaming charges were significantly reduced. That increased subscriptions to Russian telecom operators in Belarus, accordingly augmenting incoming voice traffic, text messaging and data traffic. From April 1, 2022, operators cancelled incoming call charges across the Union State.

Now we are working together with our Belarusian friends on a comprehensive decision to abolish roaming across the Union State territory. At the preparatory stage, we agreed to develop a financial and economic model based on the averaged data on the use of mobile plans that do not exceed 300 minutes of outgoing calls and 20-25 GB of data traffic per month. Such parameters are in line with the best international practice.

In general, our experts believe that Russian subscribers in Belarus and Belarusian subscribers in Russia will be able to take advantage of “home” paying plans for telecom services from April 2025. We will make every effort to complete the work by that time.