TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Normalising relations between Azerbaijan  and Armenia
2. Air service resumption between Russia and Georgia
3. Talks with the EU on the mutual recognition of vaccination certificates
4. Joint initiatives with China on the Korean Peninsula
5. Statements by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg on Finland and Sweden
6. Facilitating the evacuation of Russian nationals from Kazakhstan
7. 190th birthday of Russian diplomat Nikolay Ignatyev
8. Promoting normalisation between Azerbaijan and Armenia
9. Settlement on the Azerbaijan-Armenia border
10. Applying the demand that NATO return to the 1997 set-up to Bulgaria and Romania
11. Reinforcing relations between Russia and Southeast Asia
12. Prospects for engaging Washington in settling Ukraine’s internal conflict
13. Intra-Venezuelan talks
14. Italy’s role in Russia-West relations
15. Development of Russia-Iraq ties
16. International pressure on the United States to end Washington’s blockade of Cuba
17. Manifestations of religious intolerance around the world
18. Working with Pakistan on the Afghan issue
19. Calls for the creation of Greater Albania in Pristina and Tirana
20. Future of relations with the West and strategic partnership with China
21. Russia’s alleged attempts to reinstate the USSR and “spheres of influence”
22. Persecution of Russian-speaking journalists in Latvia
23. Foreign Ministry’s interaction with United Russia party
24. Security in the Asia-Pacific Region and the SCO’s role
25. Economic cooperation with Japan and the initiative of introducing a preferential tax and customs regime on the Kuril Islands 
26. Russia’s role in integration associations  
27. Russia’s cooperation with the PRC on ensuring security in Eurasia
28. Russia-China interaction
29. France’s role in the conflict in eastern Ukraine
30. Russia-Norway bilateral relations

 

Normalising relations between Azerbaijan  and Armenia

 

Question: What are Russia’s goals in 2022 regarding a settlement between Azerbaijan and Armenia? This year, Russia and Azerbaijan will mark 30 years of diplomatic relations. What cooperation achievements can they report? How would you assess the achieved strategic partnership? What events have been planned for this date? Will new cooperation documents and roadmaps be signed?

Answer: We believe that the trilateral agreements set out in the statements of the leaders of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Russia of November 9, 2020, January 11, 2021, and November 26, 2021, must be implemented in full. The current priority is to launch the delimitation and demarcation of the Azerbaijani-Armenian border, and unblock transport and economic links in the region. Progress in these areas would largely contribute to the normalisation of relations between Baku and Yerevan.

This year, Russia will mark 30 years of diplomatic relations with the majority of the CIS states, including Azerbaijan and Armenia. We are preparing celebration events with each of them. Since some of them will be held in the areas of culture and education, we believe that they will also be interesting for the general public.

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Air service resumption between Russia and Georgia

 

Question: Flights between Russia and Georgia were suspended in 2019 following the well-known events that took place in Tbilisi that summer. Nevertheless, Russian officials pointed out on several occasions in 2021 that the ban was temporary and could be lifted. When can this happen, if the pandemic restrictions are disregarded? Are we losing contact with the Georgian people, considering that public diplomacy is practically not working during the ban?

Answer: This issue has been addressed in many of our public comments. Restrictions imposed on the Russian carriers to deliver Russian citizens to Georgia are temporary. We have set forth the conditions for lifting them many times. The Georgian party is well aware of them. They include stabilisation in Georgia, an end to the Russophobic campaign in Georgia, and removing threats to the safety of our citizens.  We also need to take the sanitary and epidemiological circumstances into account.

Russia had to adopt these restrictions in response to the provocation staged by Georgian radicals. At the same time, we remain committed to normalising Russian-Georgian relations, overcoming differences, and restoring and strengthening bilateral ties, all of which will meet the interests of our peoples.  But this process must be a two-way street. We hope that the Georgian authorities will draw conclusions from past events and will adopt a more balanced policy towards Russia.

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Talks with the EU on the mutual recognition of vaccination certificates

 

Question: Can you update us on the talks with the EU regarding the mutual recognition of the vaccination certificates? What stands in the way of progress in these talks?

Answer: Contacts with the EU on the mutual recognition of digital vaccination certificates are carried out by the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Digital Development, with the Foreign Ministry providing expert and advisory support in the process. We believe that depoliticised expert interaction between the relevant Russian and EU agencies in the interests of facilitating safe trips abroad for citizens of Russia and the EU countries is the main prerequisite if we want to advance on this track.

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Joint initiatives with China on the Korean Peninsula

 

Question: In 2021, Russia and China came up with a joint initiative to ease the sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council on North Korea. What are the results of this step? Will there be initiatives regarding the Korean Peninsula taken jointly with China this year?

Answer: Indeed, in late October 2021, Russia and China circulated a draft political and humanitarian resolution regarding North Korea in the UN Security Council, which involves making mitigating adjustments to the international sanctions in the humanitarian sphere and other civilian areas that are not related to the nuclear missile programme. We believe that providing assistance to the people of the DPRK would be a very timely and responsible step by the international community amid the pandemic. In addition, the adoption of this resolution can help build trust among the states involved and serve as a strong incentive for reviving political dialogue.

We have explained our thinking to the UN Security Council member states. Unfortunately, the United States and its European allies are not yet ready to accept it, and are pursuing a patently flawed strategy of sanctions and pressure against Pyongyang without offering any constructive ideas. Nevertheless, in the coming year, we plan to continue to promote both the draft political and humanitarian resolution and Russian-Chinese approaches to Korean settlement in general. The latter are included in the joint 2017 roadmap and the 2019 action plan developed as a follow-up. Both remain relevant. We firmly believe that political dialogue is the only way to overcome problems faced by the peninsula, including the nuclear one. The dialogue can be used to find ways to satisfy the legitimate concerns of the stakeholders, including the provision of security guarantees.

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Statements by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg on Finland and Sweden

 

Question: At a news conference in Brussels, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said Finland and Sweden are guaranteed a speedy accession to the Alliance. Will his remarks influence the agenda of the talks on security guarantees?

Answer: We regard the NATO Secretary General’s statements on readiness to admit these countries into the Alliance as a cavalier attempt to exert external pressure on the policies of Finland and Sweden, with which we have long-standing friendly relations.  We highly value the effective contribution of these non-aligned states to European security.

We are convinced that a non-bloc status is the most effective way for these countries to ensure their security in these turbulent times.

We have formulated the agenda of the talks very clearly. It is built around three key elements: NATO must abandon its expansion plans, it must not deploy attack weapons systems near Russia’s borders, and the bloc must return to the configuration that existed at the time of the signing of the Russia-NATO Founding Act in 1997.

We look forward to NATO providing a promised substantive written response to a draft agreement with the Alliance that we have prepared.

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Facilitating the evacuation of Russian nationals from Kazakhstan

 

Question: Russia promptly started evacuating Russian nationals from Kazakhstan as soon as the riots started. How did the Foreign Ministry and the Defence Ministry manage to act so quickly to bring people home?

And a question concerning your colleagues from Austria and Hungary whose families also urgently flew to Russia: how was that decision made and did they have other options to leave the territory that was dangerous at the time?

Answer: As soon as we began to receive alarming reports from the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Foreign Ministry arranged round-the-clock monitoring of the developments and evaluated possible risks and security threats to our nationals. Many Russians had travelled to Kazakhstan on holiday over the New Year’s or to visit their relatives.

On the instruction of Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, a 24-hour hotline was set up in the Foreign Ministry’s Crisis Management Centre. Call takers processed more than 3,000 requests, including some asking for help to return to Russia as soon as possible. The hotline operated amid restricted access to mobile communications, the landline and the internet in Kazakhstan.

Hotlines and emergency centres operated at the Russian Embassy in Nur-Sultan and the Consulate General in Almaty. A task group was established to maintain close contact with the Defence Ministry, the Border Service of the Russian Federal Security Service and other competent agencies.

Thanks to prompt action by our military, an air bridge was soon created for repatriation of Russian nationals onboard Defence Ministry planes. In the course of this unprecedented air operation, around 2,500 people were evacuated safely and without any incidents between January 9−12.

We were particularly concerned about small children and children of school age. Specifically, we arranged the immediate evacuation of a children’s sports team from Yekaterinburg and the junior speedskating team from the Chelyabinsk Region.

We supported evacuation of CSTO member states’ nationals and nationals of Austria, Hungary, Belgium and Greece (at the request of their respective diplomatic missions) onboard Defence Ministry transport aircraft. Emergency teams from the Foreign Ministry were sent to the Chkalovsky Airport to assist with urgent organisational, diplomatic and visa matters, including in time for the arrival of repatriation flights at nighttime. Specialists from the Federal Service for Oversight of Consumer Protection and Welfare and the Russian Healthcare Ministry provided sanitary and epidemiological oversight at the Chkalovsky Airport.

We appreciate the effective cooperation and coordinated work with our colleagues from the Defence Ministry and other agencies in these critical conditions. We are still receiving messages of gratitude from our citizens and foreign embassies.

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190th birthday of Russian diplomat Nikolay Ignatyev

 

Question: How does the Foreign Ministry plan to celebrate the 190th birth anniversary of Nikolay Ignatyev, an outstanding Russian diplomat?

Answer: According to the established practice, 190 years is not a major anniversary. For this reason, the Foreign Ministry does not plan any events to mark the next birth anniversary of the Russian diplomat and statesman Nikolay Ignatyev (1832-1908).

Earlier, the Foreign Ministry supported the project of the Ideological Centre of Marxism online publication to erect a monument to Ignatyev in Vladivostok. The country’s first monument to the outstanding diplomat, Count Nikolay Ignatyev was unveiled in the village of Ignatyevo, Blagoveshchensky District, in September 2020.

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Promoting normalisation between Azerbaijan and Armenia

 

Question: How do you see the future of the South Caucasus, where external players are all too active now? If we are moving towards peace, why is the problem of returning prisoners still unresolved, and why is there persistent enmity?

Answer: We believe that every party wishing to join the process of normalising relations between Azerbaijan and Armenia and ensuring stability and security in the South Caucasus should not play a zero-sum game, but consider and respect the interests of the parties to the conflict and the trilateral agreements reached between the leaders of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Russia.

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Settlement on the Azerbaijan-Armenia border

 

Question: In view of the recent events in Kazakhstan that posed a threat to the country’s statehood, the CSTO dispatched its peacekeeping force within just a few hours to help restore and maintain order. On the other hand, the situation in the Armenian regions bordering on Azerbaijan has been extremely tense for several months now. Casualties continue to be reported; the Azerbaijanis are engaged in construction work on the Armenian territory, and opening roads. Several dozen Armenian prisoners continue to be held in Azerbaijani prisons. Meanwhile, the President of Azerbaijan assures the world that the situation has stabilised, and that Azerbaijan is ready to sign a peace treaty with Armenia. Can you tell us how long this situation will persist?

Answer: We are consistently making efforts to resolve the situation on the border between Azerbaijan and Armenia, but unfortunately, armed clashes occur from time to time, resulting in casualties. A bilateral Commission on the delimitation of the Azerbaijani-Armenian border with its subsequent demarcation needs to be set up as soon as possible. We are ready to provide Baku and Yerevan with any consultative assistance in this process.

As for the prisoners, Russia is active in addressing this problem. As a reminder, 146 detained persons have been returned since December 2, 2020 with the Russian peacekeepers’ mediation: 127 to Armenia and 19 to Azerbaijan.

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Applying the demand that NATO return to the 1997 set-up to Bulgaria and Romania

 

Question: What will Russia’s demand that NATO return to the 1997 framework mean for Bulgaria and Romania? Will they have to leave NATO, remove US bases from their territory, or something else?

Answer: You mentioned one of the cornerstones of Russia’s initiatives. It was deliberately set forth with utmost clarity to avoid any ambiguity. We are talking about the withdrawal of foreign forces, equipment, and weapons, as well as taking other steps to return to the set-up we had in 1997 in non-NATO countries. This includes Bulgaria and Romania.

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Reinforcing relations between Russia and Southeast Asia

 

Question: Could you share some information on diplomatic efforts in 2022 to strengthen Russia’s relations with Southeast Asia, including Vietnam?

Answer: We see good prospects for further strengthening mutually beneficial ties with all Southeast Asian nations within the influential Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

In this context, we would like to note the substantial potential for cooperation on political, security, trade, economic, scientific and technical matters. We do hope to expand the cultural and humanitarian dimensions in our bilateral relations, and revive tourist flows, which have been damaged by two years of the coronavirus pandemic. We scheduled meetings of intergovernmental commissions with many Southeast Asian countries, as well as consultations at the foreign ministry level, and other high-level contacts. In July, we will be marking 125 years of diplomatic relations with Thailand.

We are committed to effectively cooperating with Bangkok, Jakarta and Phnom Penh as the current APEC, G20 and ASEAN chairs, respectively.

We support ASEAN’s leading role in promoting constructive forms of international cooperation for promoting a settlement in Myanmar. Together with our ASEAN partners, Russia stands ready to provide humanitarian assistance to this country, including through our genuine contribution to fighting the Covid-19 pandemic.

Russia is committed to building closer ties with Vietnam, our long-standing and reliable friend. This year, we intend to keep up our proactive political dialogue and cooperation on many key topics and subjects, guided by the Joint Statement on the 2030 Vision of a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, adopted in late 2021 during the visit by President of Vietnam Xuan Phuc Nguyen to Russia.

First, we expect Russia and Vietnam to strengthen their trade and economic ties, including under the Free Trade Agreement between EAEU countries and Vietnam. It is our strong belief that we need to step up our investment ties and expand our cooperation in oil and gas exploration and development in Vietnam and Russia.

We pay a lot of attention to humanitarian and cultural contacts. Once the restrictions are lifted, we will hold the initiatives as part of the cross years that had to be postponed, including the closing ceremony. We reaffirm our commitment to promoting educational exchanges in every possible way.

We expect Russia and Vietnam to work closely together on fighting the coronavirus. The Socialist Republic of Vietnam was one of the first countries to register the Sputnik V vaccine in March 2021. Vietnamese companies signed contracts for the delivery of 60 million doses of this vaccine. We are exploring opportunities for transferring the technology in order to localise the full production cycle in Vietnam. In late December 2021, Russia sent a humanitarian shipment to Hanoi with 100,000 does of the Sputnik Light vaccine, which is expected to be registered there soon.

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Prospects for engaging Washington in settling Ukraine’s internal conflict

 

Question: Is there any prospect for the United States getting involved in the talks about stabilising the situation in Ukraine, including in the updated Normandy format?

Answer: As a reminder, the coup in Kiev in February 2014 took place with the direct support of Washington. This coup led to the bloodshed in Donbass, which continues to this day.

Until 2018, we maintained quite constructive contacts with the United States, realising that it has significant influence on Kiev and can lead it to implementing the Minsk agreements. We do not object to Washington getting involved in the peace process now, either. Of course, with the understanding that its participation will create a positive “added value” primarily in terms of encouraging Kiev to fulfil its obligations under the Minsk agreements in full, including granting a special status to Donbass.

As for the potential participation of the United States in the Normandy format, it must be understood that this platform has been operating for eight years now. As far as we know, our co-mediators - Germany and France - would prefer to keep in its current form.

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Intra-Venezuelan talks

 

Question: Regional elections were held in Venezuela on November 21, 2021 which, for the first time in many years, provided certain guarantees and were held with the participation of the opposition. However, the talks in Mexico were suspended after Alex Saab’s extradition. Russia is the guarantor behind these talks. Do you think they should be resumed?

Answer: No doubt, the elections in Venezuela contributed to stabilising the political process. The voting took place in strict compliance with the Constitution and national legislation of Venezuela in presence of international observers from 55 countries, including Russia, as well as from the UN and the EU. Participation in the electoral process of a wide range of opposition forces largely became possible thanks to the talks held in Mexico between the government of Venezuela and the Unitary Platform. Other important results of this format may include recognition by the opposition of the legitimacy of the Nicolas Maduro government and the consensus of the Venezuelan parties regarding the detrimental effect of the US unilateral restrictions on the Venezuelan economy and on the standard of living of its people.

Clearly, successful talks were not part of Washington’s plans, and it thwarted this process in October 2021 by way of direct intervention. As a reminder, in violation of generally recognised international legal norms, the US authorities arrested Venezuelan diplomat Alex Saab within the borders of a third state. Mr Saab, who is also a member of the government delegation to Mexico talks, was extradited to the United States. We issued multiple public warnings to the effect that this move would destroy the constructive atmosphere of the talks. Unfortunately, that is exactly what has happened.

Our principled position is that the solution to intra-Venezuelan differences can only be achieved through a peaceful and inclusive dialogue between all political forces within the constitutional field, while respecting the sovereignty of Venezuela. Following this logic, Russia has consistently supported every attempt at holding intra-Venezuelan talks in Oslo, Barbados, and Mexico City. However, importantly, the Norwegian mediators and supporting countries, such as Russia, are there only to promote the dialogue. At the same time, the right to resume the negotiating process belongs exclusively to the Venezuelan parties. At the moment, we continue to promote constructive contacts between all responsible political forces of Venezuela, regardless of where they may be held.

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Italy’s role in Russia-West relations

 

Question: President Vladimir Putin has invited Prime Minister of Italy Mario Draghi to visit Russia this year. What role can Italy play in improving relations between Russia and the West?

Answer: Russian-Italian relations stand out against the backdrop of foreign policy events in Europe and the world. They are noted for the sides’ readiness for compromise, mutual respect, a desire to take each other’s concerns into account, and an interest in maintaining mutually beneficial cooperation and conducting a frank and substantive dialogue on all issues of concern to our countries.

We have developed contacts at all levels of executive, legal and judicial authorities. Consultations and two-plus-two format meetings are held at the level of the Foreign Ministry, and other ministries and agencies contribute to our ties when necessary. Overall, the citizens of Russia and Italy support our governments’ efforts taken under the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the Russian Federation and the Italian Republic, signed in 1994.

Of great importance is the strengthening of mutually beneficial business ties. Italy is Russia’s third largest trade partner in Europe. During the 18th meeting of the Russian-Italian Council for Economic, Industrial, Currency and Financial Cooperation, held in Rome on December 6, 2021, the sides agreed to promote practical interaction in energy, manufacturing, transport, high technology and investments.

President Vladimir Putin maintains close ties with Prime Minister Mario Draghi. Last year, they had four telephone conversations (August 19,September 22, October 19, and November 22). Meetings at the highest level are extremely important for boosting bilateral relations, and we also expect the potential visit by the Italian Prime Minister at the Russian President’s invitation to have a similar effect.

It is notable that not only Italy, but also other European countries have expressed interest in working with Russia based on a positive agenda. This would definitely contribute to the creation of a more favourable atmosphere on the European continent and easing the tensions that are being artificially fuelled by the NATO and EU leaderships at the initiative of the United States and the aggressive Russophobic minority. Happily, North Atlantic winds have not yet blown common sense and the very instinct of survival out of the western part of our common European home. We are confident that prudent forces in Western Europe can make themselves heard and take a constructive and responsible approach to Russia’s proposals on strengthening European security. Historically, Italy has repeatedly made efforts to normalise East-West relations, both during the Cold War and over the past few decades. If it applies this approach in the current situation, we will wholeheartedly support these efforts by our Italian colleagues.

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Development of Russia-Iraq ties

 

Question: After the parliamentary election, Iraq is forming a new government. What are the prospects of Russia’s future relations with Iraq and the Iraqi Kurdistan in particular?

Answer: We welcome the results of the early elections to the Council of Representatives (the parliament) of Iraq on October 10, 2021, which were finalised on December 27, 2021. These elections are an important step towards the normalisation of the political and socioeconomic situation in the country. We hope that the Iraqi parliament members will manage to form a capable new government within the set timeframe that will enjoy the support of all major political forces, ethnic and religious groups in Iraq.

Iraq is one of Russia’s key partners in the Middle East with whom we share long-standing traditions of friendship and mutually beneficial cooperation. We maintain regular contacts with representatives of federal authorities and the leaders of the Kurdish autonomy. It is also imperative that we always respect Iraq’s unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity.

We intend to continue to take intensive efforts to expand our multi-dimensional cooperation with Iraq for the benefit of our nations and in the interests of strengthening peace and security in the Middle East.

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International pressure on the United States to end Washington’s blockade of Cuba

 

Question: Russia has always condemned the US embargo against Cuba objecting to the policy of sanctions in the world. In your opinion, how can Russia and the international community persuade the United States to abandon the policy that the UN General Assembly has been condemning for the past 29 years?

Answer: Russia’s delegation to the UN pursues a consistent course of exerting international pressure on the United States, seeking immediate and unconditional lifting of the economic, trade and financial embargo against Cuba. The UN General Assembly expresses its objections to the United States’ unilateral measures against Cuba on a regular basis and calls for abandoning this destructive policy.

Every year the UN General Assembly adopts a corresponding resolution, with the US delegation invariably requests a vote on the resolution. Results are rather telling, as during the vote on the latest Resolution 75/289 adopted in 2021, 184 countries voted in favour, 3 abstained (Brazil, Colombia and Ukraine) and only two voted against (the United States and Israel).

According to this resolution, UN Secretary-General releases annual reports with an updated review of the unilateral measures taken by the United States against Cuba and their consequences for the country’s economy, and advises to lift the embargo as soon as possible. Every time Russia contributes to this report and supports the resolution provisions during the general debate at the UN General Assembly.

However, despite all the efforts of the global community, the United States continue to ignore the UN General Assembly resolutions and the Secretary-General’s recommendations. Washington’s policy on Cuba is a classic example of double standards and disregard for international law. On our part, we will continue to stress that this US policy is deeply flawed. Together with like-minded countries, we will continue to pressure those who initiated the embargo until these illegal restrictions against Cuba are fully and unconditionally lifted.

We regret that some countries took up the course of unconditional support of this clearly destructive policy of the United States against Cuba. This course runs counter to the obligations under the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, which clearly denounces unilateral economic measures.

Such actions also clash with the principles of humanity and protection of human rights which the countries supporting the United States claim to be committed to. The tragic consequences of the embargo for the Cuban people are well-known and have been extensively laid down in the UN Secretary-General’s reports. We hope that our partners will closely review this data ahead of the next vote on the resolution and will take it into account when making their decisions.

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Manifestations of religious intolerance around the world

 

Question: At the annual news conference in late December 2021, President of Russia Vladimir Putin condemned inappropriate jokes about Prophet Muhammad and emphasised that he does not view this as freedom of speech. The Islamic world appreciated the President’s position. Prime Minister of Pakistan Imran Khan also praised President Vladimir Putin’s statement and suggested the criminalisation of blasphemy to ensure respect for all religions at the global level. Is Russia ready to support this initiative?

Answer: We respect religious feelings and consider it necessary to take measures to provide the freedom of religion. We are concerned by both religious intolerance and derogatory attitudes towards Islam, Christianity and other confessions, disguised as the freedom of speech and creative freedom. The close stance of Moscow and Islamabad on this issue creates a good base for our fruitful interaction with the Islamic Republic of Pakistan as one of the most respected countries of the Islamic world. We hope for further active cooperation within relevant forums, including the Russia-Islamic World Strategic Vision Group.

As for a legal ban on blasphemy, Russia does not permit insults to the religious feelings of believers. In accordance with the Russian Criminal Code, such actions are punishable with penalties up to imprisonment. According to the principle of the separation of powers, the adoption of any additional laws, including in this sphere, are in the competence of the parliament: the State Duma and the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly.

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Working with Pakistan on the Afghan issue

 

Question: Peace in Afghanistan is crucial for security in the region. The events in Kazakhstan proved this. Russia plays a very important role in the region, and so does Pakistan. What possibilities for bilateral cooperation do you see? What progress can be made together in 2022? Does Russia plan to make a clear statement on recognition of the Taliban movement in the near future?

Answer: Russia is actively interacting with Pakistan on the Afghan agenda both on the bilateral level and as part of multilateral mechanisms such as the “expanded trio” (Russia, China, the US and Pakistan) and the Moscow consultations format on Afghanistan. In January-February, the expanded trio will hold their next meeting, but the exact site has not been determined yet.

All these efforts are aimed at, first of all, successful completion of the intra-Afghan peace process and creation of a true inclusive government in the country that will reflect the interests of all the main ethnopolitical forces. It is also important that the Taliban prioritises the fight against terrorism, including ISIS that is boosting its influence, as well as the persistent problem of drug trafficking.

We consider Pakistan one of the key regional players with great influence on the developments in Afghanistan.

The decision on the international recognition of the Taliban movement will depend on how well the new Afghan authorities will be able to deal with these objectives.

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Calls for the creation of Greater Albania in Pristina and Tirana

 

Questions: You have mentioned double standards the collective West has been using when dealing with Serbs, Kosovo, and Metohija. The leaders of the Kosovo Albanians in Pristina understand that without Russia’s agreement they will never get the UN Security Council, where Russia has veto power, to recognise Kosovo. We are now hearing more and more talk of unification between Kosovo, which has not been recognised as a state, and Albania. The West keeps silent. Could you please comment on these developments?

Answer: International law, primarily the UN Security Council Resolution 1244, which, among other things, stipulates Serbia’s territorial integrity with the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija as its part, offers the only sustainable pathway to resolving the Kosovo issue. This document sets the framework for negotiations between Belgrade and Pristina for working out a lasting solution that would suit Serbia and be approved by the UN Security Council.

Leaders in Pristina have been seeking to convince the rest of the world that the infamous “Kosovo statehood” could provide a viable solution, but they must finally come to terms with the fact that these provocative attempts are doomed. Shoring up Albanian nationalism and chauvinism, systematic oppression of the Serbian population and other non-Albanians, pressuring the Serbian Orthodox Church – all this demonstrates that this project will never succeed.

The Western silence you have mentioned is no longer surprising. It is a symptom that Pristina’s outside patrons blindly pander to the Kosovar Albanian radicals. Mandated by the UN General Assembly to act as a mediator in the dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina, the European Union has clearly failed in this mission. It has been unable to overcome Kosovo’s efforts to sabotage its obligations to establish the Community of Serb Municipalities in the region in almost nine years since the conclusion of an agreement to this effect.

We will keep pushing for an adequate assessment of Pristina’s brazen initiatives, including within international structures such as the UN Security Council, in the interest of peace and security in the Balkans.

Finally, we fully share the concerns about the periodic statements coming from Pristina, as well as Tirana, on the creation of the so-called Greater Albania by uniting “two Albanian states” in the Balkans. These are clearly seditious aspirations – there is no other way to designate them. Any non-inclusive attempt to redraw borders in this region would be destructive by definition, considering the fragile stability in this part of Europe, where much has yet to be done to overcome the consequences of the 1990s wars.

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Future of relations with the West and strategic partnership with China

 

Question: In the event our dialogue with the United States and NATO on security guarantees fails and our relations with the West follow a negative, confrontational scenario, will Russia be able to oppose the West alone?

In this regard, how important will it be for you to deepen strategic partnership with China in overcoming military threats and the consequences of the crippling sanctions that the United States and its European allies are threatening us with?

Answer: The security guarantees proposals put forward by Russia are a realistic vision of how to normalise the European security situation in the long run and to create conditions for peaceful coexistence between Russia and the West. In the current circumstances, this is perhaps the only way to strengthen overall security on the continent without compromising the security of individual countries in the region.

Let’s not get ahead of ourselves. The negotiating process has not even begun in earnest. We hope that our Western colleagues will deliver on the promises that they made at the meetings in Geneva and Brussels on January 10 and 12, respectively. We expect the United States and NATO to put down on paper their response to the Russian initiative. There are reasons to believe that our partners understand that they should not drag this issue out. In any case, we reserve the right to develop a further algorithm of actions to ensure Russia’s security interests, depending on the response that the United States and NATO will give to our proposals.

With regard to Russian-Chinese ties, we have repeatedly pointed out that they are progressing quite well. Our relations are valuable in and of themselves and do not depend on the global political situation. We are building them on the basis of respect for sovereignty, the specifics of political culture and non-interference in each other’s internal affairs. Moscow and Beijing have close or overlapping approaches to addressing key international problems, which is of fundamental importance and contributes to our countries playing a stabilising role in international politics.

The Russian-Chinese strategic partnership exists in the context of objective historical logic and is based on the enormous combined potential of the two states. Also, one should not forget about the stable public consensus in Russia and China on the prospects, the scope and the depth of bilateral cooperation.

It is time for our US colleagues to realise that Washington’s “double containment” policy with regard to Moscow and Beijing is obsolete and devoid of good prospects for the United States. The Americans will do much more good for themselves and the world if they abandon their arrogant claim to global dominance and start an equal and fair dialogue with Russia, China and other major players in order to find balanced solutions to pressing issues of international security and development. We stand ready to do this work.

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Russia’s alleged attempts to reinstate the USSR and “spheres of influence”

 

Question: We would like to ask you about the importance of Russia’s sphere of influence in connection with the crisis over Ukraine, whether Russia wants to revive the Soviet Union, the former “Soviet empire,” as the West believes it does, and whether the current deadlock in Russian-US relations is proof that they will never become good friends or reliable partners?

Answer: It is hardly realistic to speak about the revival or restoration of the Soviet Union. History cannot be reversed, as President Vladimir Putin has said more than once. In practical terms, we proceed from existing realities.

Just like the United States and other countries, Russia has its own legitimate interests, including in the sphere of security. Like any other state, we respond to the emergence of external threats and challenges, especially military and military-technical ones. We are doing this in strict conformity with international law. There are no grounds for interpreting our actions as an attempt to create an exclusive sphere of Russian influence.

At the same time, our Western colleagues, who claim that the idea of “spheres of influence” is unacceptable in modern conditions, have provided numerous examples of double standards. Several years ago, the then EU foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini said that the Western Balkans is a region where all problems will be dealt with by the EU and where other players must not interfere. She was clearly and primarily referring to Russia and China. What is this if not an attempt to outline a sphere of influence?

Just as a reminder: the current High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell said that the EU must not let Russia and China take control of Afghanistan after the withdrawal of the NATO coalition. He also said that Russia should stop working in Africa altogether, because this is “their place.” French officials have been speaking at all levels about Russian presence in Mali, saying in the most blatant neocolonial manner that it is a red line for France.

Another recent example is US Secretary of State Antony Blinken asking Kazakhstan’s authorities to explain “why they feel the need for” inviting the CSTO to help restore order and repel the terrorist threat in the country. The Western expert and political community threw a fit when Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov refused to give a clear answer to the question about Russia’s military-political plans regarding Cuba and Venezuela. Isn’t this proof of an arrogant mentality, according to which they may do anything whereas Russa may do nothing?

This shows that it is the collective West rather than Russia that is dividing the world into spheres of influence and backyards. After the Soviet Union left the historical stage, US leaders started building a new international order, that is, spreading US spheres of influence throughout the world. This policy has resulted in wars and chaos, hundreds of thousands of lives lost, destroyed states, millions of refugees and persisting geopolitical tension.

As for the Russia-US relationship, which has approached a critically dangerous line through Washington’s fault, it is urgently necessary to launch a serious, substantive dialogue, and the United States and its allies must also take concrete steps to provide reliable security guarantees to Russia. NATO’s continued aggressive activities on the eastern flank and its hostile moves towards Russa, such as surprise military exercises, the dangerous convergence and manoeuvres of warships and combat aircraft, as well as the military development of Ukrainian territory, are absolutely unacceptable.

As for becoming good friends or reliable partners, this depends on the US side. Russia took steps towards this end, but these steps were taken for granted, and the only response was arrogant disregard for Russia’s priorities.

Today we need to build an atmosphere of confidence anew and to create at least a semblance of normality. This is in our common interests. By and large, there are no irreconcilable differences between Russia and the United States. Our colleagues only need to show political will. We are always ready for an honest conversation. But we will not talk about issues of interest to Washington when our legitimate concerns are openly disregarded. The Americans must reflect on their errors, draw conclusions from their unsuccessful attempts to interfere in our internal affairs, and seriously adjust their conduct. It is time to give up the claim to global domination, which is unacceptable in the current geopolitical reality. Sustainable interaction will be impossible otherwise, although a dialogue on issues of common interest can and should be maintained.

Either we coordinate a more or less positive agenda that will take Russia’s priorities into account, or the degree of confrontation, which is already excessive, will increase. If the US policy remains unchanged, we will respond harshly within the framework of the counter-containment of Washington’s hostile activities.

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Persecution of Russian-speaking journalists in Latvia

 

Question: As you know, the Latvian authorities have been persecuting journalists from Baltnews and Sputnik for more than a year now. At present, the investigation is over and the materials have been submitted to the prosecutor general’s office. Pressure on journalists is becoming stronger not only in Latvia but also in other Baltic states, as well as other European countries. Baltnews journalist Sergey Seredenko is in custody in Estonia. What are the reasons for the real war against journalists that work with Russian media? What can we do to protect journalists and their right to practice their profession?

Answer: Unfortunately, media freedom is on the decline in the entire Baltic region. Posing as zealous defenders of democratic values, the authorities of these EU member countries continue to consistently attack Russian and Russian-language media and refuse to tolerate any dissent. They are openly limiting freedom of speech, exerting pressure on problematic journalists under the flimsy pretext of “defending national security” and creating all kinds of obstacles to their professional activities with a view to establishing total control over the media landscape.

Below are just several examples that speak for themselves.

On October 14, 2021, criminal case files of 14 Latvian journalists that cooperate with Baltnews and Sputnik were submitted to that country’s prosecutor general’s office. On October 21, 2021, the Latvian mass media regulator groundlessly revoked the broadcasting license of the First Baltic Channel, which rebroadcasts Russia’s Channel One. On October 29, 2021, a court in Riga passed a guilty verdict on Yury Alexeyev and sentenced him to 14 months in prison. He is a well-known Russian language essayist and public figure in the country.

Tallinn continues exerting serious pressure on the local Russian language outlet Sputnik Media, having shut down its Russian predecessor Sputnik Estonia. In a broader context, the local authorities are engaged in the unprincipled systematic ousting of the Russian language and everything related to it from the national information space and persistent discrimination against the Russian-speaking population. They are depriving Russian speakers of the right to receive information in their native language, which is enshrined in international law and the political commitments of the Baltic countries.

One of the recent examples of this systematic policy is a plan of action drafted by the Ministry of Education and Science of Estonia. This plan is aimed at ending budget support for the Russian language by 2035. According to the draft, instruction in Estonian in all state and municipal Russian schools must amount to 75 percent. Other subjects will be taught in foreign languages, which is how Russian is designated.

The UN Human Rights Council and other human rights organisations have also repeatedly criticised Latvia for its discriminatory language policy.

The Foreign Ministry and authorised representatives of Russia have repeatedly gone to relevant multilateral venues, including the UN, OSCE and the Council of Europe to highlight what is happening in the Baltic countries. We have spoken many times about the unacceptable discriminatory policy of the local authorities in our direct contacts with the corresponding EU representatives. Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Maria Zakharova is regularly raising issues that are uncomfortable for the Baltic states in the public space. She urges relevant institutions, including the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, to take steps to fix this dismal situation in the OSCE space.

It is perfectly obvious that the time for the “quiet diplomacy” preached by some European officials as regards the Baltic countries has long since passed. It is no longer possible to hush up or whitewash blatant violations of the rights of journalists and the media. This approach has been completely discredited. We expect resolute actions towards restoring fundamental democratic principles and protecting pluralism of opinion and freedom of speech in the Baltic countries.

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Foreign Ministry’s interaction with United Russia party

 

Question: Could you please tell is about your interaction with the United Russia party?

Answer: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Russia’s foreign missions abroad provide assistance to Russian political parties in their international activities, including in organising visits abroad and establishing partnership relations with political parties in other countries. These efforts are aimed at ensuring broad public consensus regarding the implementation of the foreign policy approved by the President of the Russian Federation, further aligning efforts by different political forces in order to strengthen our country’s positions in the international arena. 

The pandemic has had an impact on all aspect of life and at the same time has contributed to the emergence and progress of new interaction formats, in particular via videoconference. In the past year alone, United Russia, with the support from the Ministry and its missions abroad, used this format for holding forums with political parties of the SCO and BRICS member countries, the ruling parties in Africa, ASEAN and Latin America, as well as an interparty conference Global Challenges of the 21st Century: Interparty Dimension. These events clearly demonstrated that partner parties have similar approaches to resolving current issues of global development and jointly call for building a fair multipolar world order free from power dictate and all forms of discrimination, based on respecting countries’ sovereignty and identity, and strict compliance with the goals and principles stated in the UN Charter.

Interparty interaction is a substantial resource for promoting diversified cooperation both in multilateral and bilateral formats. United Russia, which recently celebrated its 20th anniversary, has been making a hefty contribution, since its inception, to our country’s development as a truly law-governed, socially oriented democratic state. It also cultivates close ties with political parties on many continents to foster dialogue, cooperation, friendship and trust between peoples.

President Vladimir Putin instructed the leaders of the United Russia party’s list at the 2021 State Duma elections to continue joint work with the parties within the established specialised commissions. Sergey Lavrov headed the Commission on international cooperation and support for compatriots living abroad under the General Council of the United Russia party. The commission had its first meeting on December 28, 2021.

The discussion focused on promising areas of the commission’s engagement. Improvements in the migration policy and Russian legislation concerning citizenship to attract Russian speakers and bearers of a culture that is close to us, as well as ensuring the protection of legal rights and interests of our compatriots abroad were designated as priorities. 

The meeting participants underscored the important role of interparty and interparliamentary ties in promoting foreign policy initiatives and a positive image of Russia in the world, countering sanction pressure, fighting the falsification of history and attempts to revise the outcome of World War II, developing trade, economic, humanitarian and cultural cooperation. 

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Security in the Asia-Pacific Region and the SCO’s role

 

Question: What is your vision of security in the Asia-Pacific Region and the world as a whole? Which role can the SCO play in maintaining stability and peace in this region? 

Answer: Elements of instability keep brewing in the Asia-Pacific Region (APR), which carry a risk of collapse of the decades-long balanced regional architecture of security and cooperation.

It is crucially important to prevent new dividing lines. The danger of exactly this sort of developments is increasing as some actors promote the concepts of the “Indo-Pacific Region” and implement respective national strategies. We are concerned about the Western countries’ focus on breeding minilateralism which presupposes establishing closed structures with a limited membership.

The growing naval activities in the APR of non-regional nations add to the instability. The scope of US and European countries’ joint naval exercises with regional partners is unprecedented. NATO’s intentions raise multiple questions as the Alliance’s leaders are now orienting it towards a “march” to East Asia, thousands of miles from Euro-Atlantic, following the end of the military campaign in Afghanistan.

We cannot but see the aggressive pressure used to promote purely economic initiatives designed to rewrite rules and tailor cooperation standards in the key industries that will govern the future of the world economy to meet Western business capabilities. The masterminds are not concerned about collateral damage for Asian partners, including disintegration of existing manufacturing and logistics value chains.

Such a selective approach directly contradicts empty statements on “openness and inclusivity” and runs counter to the key principles of universality and multilateralism that are the cornerstone of international relations. There is no way the “innovative” schemes that are brought to the region can complement the institutions that already exist there. These are mutually exclusive development factors. 

We do not see a meaningful alternative to the security and cooperation architecture in place in the APR that would rest on the mechanisms enhancing region-wide dialogue and increasing mutual connectivity regardless of differences in approaches and models of national development.

The SCO’s positive role in building harmonious interstate relations is growing in importance amid the escalating turbulence.

The experience gained by the organisation is in great demand, which is seen in the steady enlargement of the SCO family, consistent deepening of the integration processes and multi-vector cooperation as well as a growing interest in cross-platform interaction, primarily within the Greater Eurasian Partnership concept with the participation of the EAEU and ASEAN.

The SCO member states consistently advocate the establishment of a multipolar world order, which offers equal, shared, indivisible and comprehensive security as well as cooperation for sustainable development of all countries on the basis of international law, rather than some “rules” for the chosen few. 

It is hard to overstate the SCO’s role in countering new challenges and threats, with international terrorism and drug trafficking among them, including in cooperation with the UN and its specialised agencies. The SCO style of work has also proven its efficacy in the context of assisting in the processes that contribute to the stabilisation of the situation in Afghanistan. 

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Economic cooperation with Japan and the initiative of introducing a preferential tax and customs regime on the Kuril Islands 

 

Question: In which particular areas would Russia like to develop economic cooperation with Japan in the future?

A special economic regime was announced at the 2021 Eastern Economic Forum. Is it possible that the regime will be appended by provisions that will take into account Japan’s sovereignty over the “northern territories?”

Answer: During his telephone conversation with Russian President Vladimir Putin, Japan’s Prime Minister Fumio Kishida expressed his commitment to promoting practical cooperation with our country in a wide range of areas. We completely share this approach. Russia is interested in comprehensively extending trade and economic ties with Japan.  We do not intend to limit areas of cooperation in any way. The key is that our partners have an interest in building up cooperation in a particular field and achieving mutual benefits from joint projects. As of today, the energy industry, petrochemicals, healthcare, agriculture, forestry and urban environment are promising areas. Recently, we have actively discussed bringing together Russian and Japanese companies in the green energy sector. In our view, such areas as high added-value products and information technologies have a potential for partnership relations. We know that Russian goods coming to the Japanese market have begun to enjoy popularity among the Japanese.

We note that conditions emerged last year for restoring bilateral trade. The turnover, which had been declining in the past several years, increased by 20.5 percent throughout the eleven months of 2021 compared to the same period of 2020, reaching almost $18 billion. We believe that we need to promote large-scale bilateral projects to get trade and investment cooperation on track to maintain steady progress and to radically correct the situation.

Regarding the second part of your question, it is known that at the Eastern Economic Forum in September 2021, President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin put forward an initiative to establish a preferential tax and customs regime on the Kuril Islands. As far as we know, the bill drafted by the Government of the Russian Federation is currently being discussed at the State Duma.

We proceed from the premise that such measures must contribute to accelerated socioeconomic development in the region. Our doors are always open for our friends and partners. We welcome foreign investors in our efforts for developing cooperation on these territories, including Japanese if they show interest in that. We would like to stress, however, that Japan has no and will have no exclusive rights in this region, and any economic activities on the Kuril Islands must be in step with common provisions of Russian law. 

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Russia’s role in integration associations  

 

Question: Kazakhstan’s authorities in recent years have been leaning, apart from Russia and EAEU, towards diverse external centres of power – such as the  US, EU, China and Turkey. Do you think the January 2022 events might push them towards revising these priorities as it is obvious now that the support from the CSTO and Russia played a decisive role in maintaining the constitutional order in Kazakhstan? 

Answer: You should ask our Kazakhstani friends whether their country needs corrections in its foreign policy.

As for the Russian Federation, we will continue, as earlier, our work in showing them the attractiveness and comparable advantages of cooperation with Russia. Our assets are the resource of close allied relations, the potential of common integration associations – CSTO, EAEU, CIS and SCO, and the closest ties between our peoples, which are rooted in history.

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Russia’s cooperation with the PRC on ensuring security in Eurasia

 

Question: On January 10, you discussed the situation in Kazakhstan with China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi. Following this conversation, the Russian Foreign Ministry reported that the parties expressed unity in assessing the events and support for Kazakhstan leaders’ efforts to restore the constitutional order in the country. Were there agreements on joint steps to thwart the threat of the spread of terrorism from problem-plagued territories in Central Asia?

Answer: We maintain close contacts with our Chinese partners and coordinate efforts on all aspects of the international agenda including the situation in Kazakhstan.

The foreign ministers of Russia and China had in-depth discussions on current developments in the Republic of Kazakhstan during a telephone conversation on December 10.

Our assessments of the developments in that country are completely identical. Russia and China are concerned over the interference of internal forces including the participation of foreign mercenaries in the attacks on civilians and law enforcement personnel, during which government buildings and other facilities were seized. We believe that decisive actions by Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev were timely and commensurate with the scale of the threat the republic faced. The Chinese side gave a positive evaluation of the measures taken by the CSTO following Kazakhstan’s authorities’ appeal. 

We continue to closely coordinate our approaches within the framework of the inclusive mechanism for strategic interaction between Russia and China. The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and its Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) play a key role in ensuring security in Eurasia including in the Central Asia region.  

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Russia-China interaction

 

Question: What do you think of the overall state of Russia-China relations and how do you think we must respond to the West’s attempts to drive a wedge between China and Russia?  

Answer: We have repeatedly stressed that our countries’ interaction has reached an all-time high. Russia and China have moulded a model for a new breed of interstate relations, one that meets the core national interests of the two states. A unique multifaceted structure of cooperation has been assembled.  

We in fact have observed deliberate attempts by some Western ill-wishers to alienate Moscow and China, to sow mistrust and cause artificial tensions between us.  We believe that such policies are doomed to fail. Relations between Russia and China have intrinsic value and are devoid of political opportunism. They did not appear yesterday – we have been good neighbours over many centuries of relations. Moscow and Beijing are building up these ties following the principles of non-interference in each other’s internal affairs and based on reciprocal respect. Our approaches to key international issues are close or identical, which makes it possible to effectively coordinate efforts for the stabilisation of the global situation. We think that further expansion of mutually beneficial ties with the PRC would be the best response to the unseemly tactics of Western nations.

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France’s role in the conflict in eastern Ukraine

 

Question: What diplomatic role are France and Europe playing in settling the Ukrainian crisis? Is the Normandy format still important?

Answer: At the very beginning of the conflict in Donbass, France made a substantial contribution to its settlement. It initiated the formation of the Normandy format in June 2014 and named it after a French province. Paris hosted summits in 2015 and 2019, as well as meetings of ministers, political advisors and experts. In the Contact Group, French diplomats traditionally coordinate the work of its political subgroup, where the sides of the conflict – Kiev, Donetsk and Lugansk – are engaged in direct dialogue. These efforts deserve appreciation.

In the past year and a half or two years, the work of the Contact Group and the Normandy format has been losing momentum, if not stagnating. Kiev avoids implementing the Minsk Package of Measures and the final document of the 2019 Paris summit of the Normandy Four.

Unfortunately, France and Germany have sided with Ukraine despite their roles as mediators. We have never heard them give any public assessments of Kiev’s actions that run counter to the Minsk agreements. These include continued shelling, the drawing of forces to the contact line, the economic, financial and transit blockade of Donbass and the obstruction of political commitments to grant the region a special status and declare amnesty for its citizens.

There is no response, either, to open violations of human rights and the rights of national minorities, forced Ukrainisation, discrimination against Russian speakers, growing neo-Nazism and extrajudicial persecution of the media and political opposition.

Instead, France and other NATO countries are trying to present Russia as a party to the conflict and are actively militarising Ukraine with arms supplies. The European Union is making its contribution as well. It is also conniving at the policy of the Kiev regime, ignoring violations of human rights and the rule of law and trying to deploy its own military training mission in Ukraine. All this does not facilitate a peaceful settlement in Donbass but, on the contrary, encourages Kiev to opt for a belligerent solution.

That said, we believe it is possible to redress the situation. To do this, countries and associations that have influence on Kiev, including France and the EU, must compel Kiev to strictly adhere to the Minsk agreements and fulfil its international commitments on human rights and freedoms. We are convinced that as a participant in the Normandy format and the holder of the EU presidency, France has every opportunity to do so. It merely needs the political will.

For its part, Russia will continue its mediation in the Contact Group and the Normandy format, which is aimed at a peaceful settlement of the conflict in the east of Ukraine.

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Russia-Norway bilateral relations

 

Question: Does the conflict in Ukraine affect relations between Russia and Norway, in particular as regards the northern border?

Answer: We noted statements by the Norwegian leaders that Russia is fully responsible for the situation in Ukraine and the implementation of the Package of Measures. This rhetoric does not help promote mutual understanding. Reality is different. Kiev is subverting the implementation of the agreements, while our Western partners are ignoring this. At the same time, Oslo’s NATO allies are striving to increase their military presence in Norway, in part, in the direct vicinity of the Russian border by building up the numerical strength of their troops and conducting large-scale exercises. Thus, the plan for next spring includes the Cold Response military exercises, the largest since the Cold War, with the participation of about 40,000 troops from NATO members and their partners.

At the same time, Russia and Norway are neighbours. The border between them, established in 1326, was the first border defined by a treaty in Europe. It is also Russia’s oldest border that has never been violated by wars. In 2010, the two countries signed a Treaty Concerning Maritime Delimitation and Cooperation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean. It confirms that our countries can come to terms on difficult issues as well.

Despite the current foreign policy vicissitudes, we believe that neighbourly traditions will still prevail in our versatile cooperation with Norway. This will happen, of course, if our Norwegian partners display their will for this.

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The effect of AUKUS on nuclear non-proliferation

 

Question: The United States, Australia and Great Britain created a trilateral pact on nuclear submarines, while China condemned this initiative. This could also threaten Russia’s strategic forces in the northern Pacific. Can AUKUS be viewed as an obstacle to maintaining the nuclear non-proliferation regime?

Answer: Plans to build nuclear submarines for the Australian Navy with assistance from the United States and Great Britain within the AUKUS framework have a destabilising effect in terms of nuclear non-proliferation. Australia will receive nuclear materials and installations that are subject to IAEA safeguards in countries which signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). At the same time, we have reasons to doubt that the countries transferring these materials and installations will be willing to provide the IAEA full access to these assets. The risks to the system of safeguards stem from uncertainty on this sensitive issue. The safeguards agreement between Australia and the IAEA must be complied with in any circumstances, and the same applies to its Additional Protocol.

AUKUS participants claim that no nuclear weapons will be transferred to Australia within this partnership. However, NATO practises the so-called nuclear-sharing arrangements, which run counter to the NPT, suggesting to us that there is a real danger of Australia becoming drawn into these practices.

If Australia intends to host Great Britain’s and the US’s military infrastructure on its territory, can Canberra be viewed as a good-faith party to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga)? The potential deployment of military personnel and weapons by nuclear states in Australia calls into question the safeguards this country has been enjoying under the NWFZ treaty. In fact, through its actions Canberra undermines the very idea of NWFZs.

Overall, the Foreign Ministry expresses its concern over the emergence of new alliances which can have a negative impact on strategic stability and have far-reaching consequences in terms of regional and global stability. We have yet to find out what specifically AUKUS participants want to achieve by planning to have nuclear states deploy their military infrastructure on Australian territory.