THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
official site

One of the chief outcomes of the summit was reconfirmation of the mindset of the SCO member states to strengthen further their multivector cooperation and to streamline collaborative mechanisms within the Organization. Discussions centered on the issues of ensuring security and stability and combating the new challenges and threats, which are the priority ones for the SCO. A number of important documents were signed in Yekaterinburg developing the legal/regulatory base in this sphere – the SCO Convention against Terrorism, the Regulation on Politico-diplomatic Arrangements and Mechanisms for the SCO’s Response to Situations Jeopardizing Peace, Security and Stability, and the Agreement on Cooperation in the Area of Ensuring International Information Security.

Special attention was paid to Afghanistan-related themes.

Problems of the financial and economic crisis figured prominently in the discussions.

SCO participants expressed the intention to support contact promotion work in culture, education and youth ties. Past undertakings provide a good basis for movement forward here – enough to recall the arts festivals, the work on the creation of SCO University, and the establishment of the Youth Council.

The Heads of State took decision to grant Dialogue Partner status to Belarus and Sri Lanka and tasked the SCO Secretariat with preparing and signing with these countries the memorandums that will fix procedures and basic guidelines for cooperation.

For Russia this summit had special significance, because it concluded the year-long Russian chairmanship period of the SCO, and we are happy that the partners gave positive marks to our work.

The Republic of Uzbekistan takes over the SCO chairmanship after the summit and the Russian side, for its part, stands ready to provide assistance to the Uzbek friends.

During the meeting the leaders of the Four held a trustful and constructive exchange of views focused on the BRIC countries’ role in dealing with fundamental global problems and in consolidating their common contribution to international efforts to overcome the present crisis and to reform the world financial and economic system.

The leaders substantively discussed progress achieved in the anti-crisis process in the G20, and the prospects for the G8’s dialogue with the traditional partners (among them Brazil, India and China) on a broad range of themes, including reformation of international financial institutions, the assurance of global energy, food and climate security, and development assistance.

The tasks were defined whose solution will help to bring international cooperation in all these areas to a qualitatively new level and to achieve progress in the endeavor of shaping an equitable world architecture.

There was reiterated the mutual interest in building up the quadripartite collaboration in different multilateral entities and in deepening further the many-sided cooperation within the BRIC framework.

At the summit’s close the leaders’ joint statement was adopted, reflecting a holistic vision of the present stage in world development and of ways to surmount the global crisis. The ministerial statement on global food security, endorsed at the summit, fixes the prospects for closer joint work by our countries toward this end on international platforms, like UN and FAO, particularly on the issues of practical realization of the measures agreed upon at the World Grain Forum in St. Petersburg.

The successful holding of the first full-blown BRIC summit in Yekaterinburg bore witness to the need for such a mechanism of combining the interests of the BRIC countries as important centers of world economic and political development in dealing with key issues of the global agenda, and imparted a new impulse to the reinforcement of collective and legal elements in international affairs. An example of equal dialogue and mutually advantageous cooperation among leading states of the world is thus being formed.

It has been decided to make BRIC summits regular and to continue the practice of annual meetings of foreign and finance ministers. The joint statement by leaders of the four countries welcomes Brazil’s offer to hold the next BRIC summit in 2010.

It can already be said that the Presidents in their meeting will discuss practically the full range of relations between our countries, both in terms of bilateral cooperation and in the international dimension.

One of the key themes of the July summit will be problems linked to reduction of strategic offensive arms. Pursuant to the Joint Statement adopted by the Presidents in London, a vigorous negotiation process is under way to craft an accord to replace the START Treaty, set to expire in December 2009. Two rounds of negotiations have been held as of now – on May 19-20, 2009 in Moscow and on June 1-3, 2009 in Geneva – and an interim meeting of experts in Moscow on June 15-16, 2009. The next round is to be held on June 22-24, 2009 in Geneva.

The talks are proceeding in a constructive and businesslike vein. We presume that, at the July summit, the Presidents will be able to announce interim results. Naturally tasks will be set for the long term.

Active work is being conducted to fill the summit’s nonproliferation basket along with working through initiatives concerning some regional aspects of security. It goes without saying that serious attention will be paid to problem areas, such as the United States’ approach regarding deployment of missile defense elements in Europe.

The sides are actively engaged in structuring and devising an agenda for intergovernmental dialogue on cooperation promotion in different fields, including the trade and economic sphere, under the aegis of the two Presidents. This form of collaboration, coupled with the active dialogue between Russian and US business circles, must impart a significant impulse to our bilateral ties.

In the framework of the program for the visit of the US President, a business forum is planned to be held in which representatives of the economic elites of the two countries will take part.

Of course, humanitarian aspects of cooperation won’t be left out, either.

During the upcoming talks, pressing international problems are expected to be discussed in detail, with emphasis on the intensification of practical cooperation between Russia and the United States in the fight against the new challenges – primarily the spread of WMD and their delivery vehicles, terrorism and piracy – and on greater assistance to international efforts in the settlement of regional conflicts. Special attention will be paid to the situation in Afghanistan, where there is particularly great need for an active coordination of international stabilization efforts in the context of the presidential elections scheduled for this upcoming August. It is also important to build up cooperation between Russia and the United States, bilaterally and multilaterally, primarily in the UN Security Council and in the Quartet of international mediators, with a view to advancing the Middle East peace process.

In a word, the intensive preparation is continuing and we hope for the high productiveness of the Moscow meeting.

As is known, Belarus did not attend the ordinary session of the Collective Security Council of the Collective Security Treaty Organization held in Moscow on June 14, citing the necessity of “additionally working through the measures ensuring the inseparable link between the economic and military components of the security of the CSTO member states.” Accordingly, all the documents adopted at the session in the absence of the Belarusian side, including those concerning the creation of the CSTO Collective Operational Reaction Force (CORF), were left unsigned by Belarus President Alexander Lukashenko.

The actual reason of the Belarusian partners’ nonparticipation in the CSTO summit, which they themselves are talking about, was the problems that had arisen with the supply of dairy products from Belarus to Russia, which in our mind have a purely technical character.

We presume that the CSTO is a multilateral cooperation format specializing in problems of collective security and not in the settlement of bilateral economic disputes between member states. Such problems, as President of the Russian Federation Dmitry Medvedev noted at the end of the session, ought to be tackled in the process of bilateral consultations.

The demarche of Minsk is clearly discordant with its traditionally constructive involvement in CSTO activities and, more specifically, with its vigorous and positive input into the preparation of the materials considered at the session, including those pertaining to CORF. At the same time, we have taken note of the statement of the Belarusian side that it “regards with respect the documents signed by the CSTO member states during the Moscow meeting on June 14, 2009,” and actually reserves the possibility to accede to them later.

As to the opinion of our Belarusian colleagues about the status of the CSTO documents signed at the session, we consider them legitimate. Let me recall that the mechanism for the removal of differences of opinion is envisioned in Article 27 of the CSTO Charter. According to this Article, “Any disputes regarding the interpretation or application of the provisions of this Charter shall be resolved through consultations and negotiations between the member States concerned. In the event that agreement cannot be achieved, disputes shall be referred to the Council for consideration.”

As to the realization of the agreements reached in Moscow, above all on the Collective Operational Reaction Force, the CSTO member states signatory to the relevant documents do not intend to suspend it. We will launch mechanisms envisioned by national legislation for the entry of the CORF Agreement into force, and implement practical measures aimed at its creation and functioning. And we also expect that the pause in the assumption by the Belarusian side on a rotation basis of the chairmanship functions in the Organization will not get drawn-out. In the meanwhile, the Russian Federation will be performing these functions in a technical mode.

Overall we believe that full-fledged allied cooperation in the CSTO format meets our common long-term strategic interests.

The program of the bilateral visit envisions Lavrov’s talks with Minister for European and International Affairs Michael Spindelegger, and meetings with Federal President Heinz Fischer and Federal Chancellor Werner Faymann.

ASRC is the chief review event of the OSCE, during which its member states consider problems and commitments in the realm of “hard security,” including arms control and confidence building measures, counteraction against new threats and challenges, and conflict settlement. The proposals and recommendations voiced by ASRC participants can form the basis of possible draft decisions of the OSCE Permanent Council and Council of Ministers.

We look forward to continued discussion during the ASRC of Russian President Medvedev’s initiative for a legally binding European Security Treaty (EST). The dialogue in the OSCE framework had begun at the Helsinki Ministerial Council (December 4-5, 2008) and continued during the joint meeting of the Forum for Security Cooperation and the Permanent Council (February 18, 2009) and the winter session of the Parliamentary Assembly (February 19-20, 2009).

The Russian side is not pleased with the situation of hard security in the Euro-Atlantic region. This shows itself in the deep crisis of the Adapted CFE Treaty, in stagnant confidence-building efforts, in attempts at settling regional conflicts by force, which stood out vividly on the part of Georgia in August 2008, and in the lingering threats of international terrorism, drug trafficking and other forms of transfrontier organized crime. This state of affairs is due to the fact that the basic principles of relations have ceased to work in the Euro-Atlantic area, first of all the commitment to not secure oneself at others’ expense and the principle of the nonuse of military force in conflict settlement.

President Medvedev’s initiative to craft an EST is aimed at rectifying this alarming situation. The Russian side wants hard security issues to become the subject matter of an EST, its range of parties to include both states and major international organizations active in the sphere of security in the Euro-Atlantic space, and the EST provisions to be legally binding upon all its parties. We consider that the elaboration of an EST should be conducted on an independent negotiation platform not tied to the OSCE.

In the course of the ASRC the Russian delegation also intends to present some concrete recommendations for further steps in the framework of the OSCE security agenda.

The Russian side expects ASRC-2009 to give additional impulse to dialogue among states and international organizations on Euro-Atlantic security issues and to the work in the OSCE framework on the reinvigoration of the military-political dimension of this Organization.

On the fringes of ASRC, Sergey Lavrov is scheduled to meet with senior OSCE officials and with heads of national delegations.

Talks will focus specifically on the preparation of the first visit by a Russian President to Switzerland, scheduled for autumn 2009.

Lavrov will discuss with his Swiss counterpart, Head of the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs Micheline Calmy-Rey, further steps to promote bilateral cooperation both in the political sphere and in a number of practical fields. In particular, it will be about completing the work on draft intergovernmental agreements on visa facilitation and readmission, on scientific-technical cooperation, on interaction in the field of emergency humanitarian response, on the protection of appellations of origin and geographical indications of goods and on mutual assistance in customs matters.

The initiative of Russian President Medvedev for crafting a European Security Treaty will constitute an important theme for the talks.

In the context of the situation in the Trans-Caucasus, the sides will discuss matters relating to the functioning of the Russian Federation Interests Section at the Swiss Embassy in Tbilisi in the conditions of the absence of diplomatic relations between Russia and Georgia.

The state of Russian-Swiss relations is characterized by positive dynamics and by the mounting intensity of both top-level and high-level political dialogue.

Switzerland is an important trade partner of Russia. The bilateral trade turnover stood at US$12.2 billion at year-end 2008.

Cooperation is expanding in the humanitarian, cultural and scientific fields.

Sergey Lavrov will take part in the meeting.

We regard the upcoming meeting as an important event going beyond the framework of the OSCE.

Despite the fact that the Corfu meeting will bear an informal character, meaning that there will be no decisions made, it can provide a good opportunity for frank and unbiased brainstorming on every aspect of Euro-Atlantic security and cooperation.

We suggest that an official meeting of leaders of five international organizations (OSCE, CSTO, NATO, EU and CIS) operating in the Euro-Atlantic area should be held in 2010 to consider the security strategies adopted in them and to work out coordinated approaches with a view to creating an indivisible security space in the region.

The agenda for the meeting allows for any questions to be touched upon. In the event of “soft security” discussion we intend to call attention to the shortcomings in the performance of obligations in the field of the OSCE human dimension, some of which are undeservedly forgotten.

We intend to draw attention to the Russian initiatives for transforming the OSCE into a full-fledged international organization and putting its activities on a clearly defined footing.

We feel that if the first such meeting turns out to be successful, it will mark the beginning of a “Corfu process” of informal deliberations among the foreign ministers of the states of the Euro-Atlantic space to discuss a broad range of cooperation and security issues.

On the fringes of the Corfu meeting, Sergey Lavrov is scheduled to meet with leaders of international organizations and with the ministers of foreign affairs of their member states.

I can say that the foreign ministers of the member states of the Russia-NATO Council (RNC) have reached agreement on holding an unofficial RNC sitting on Corfu, Greece, June 27, 2009 on the fringes of the OSCE foreign ministers’ meeting.

Given the informal nature of the upcoming event neither a fixed agenda, nor the adoption of any documents is expected.

We anticipate that a frank conversation on problem issues in Russia-NATO relations, on the prospects for the resumption of political dialogue and practical cooperation in the RNC format as well as on the possibilities to discuss ways for streamlining the European security architecture will take place at the meeting of the foreign ministers.

We are interested in seeing the Central Asian states develop in the conditions of stability and security and successfully tackle the complicated political, economic and social tasks facing them.

We expect the forum to provide a useful exchange of views on ways to neutralize the threat of terrorism and extremism emanating from the territory of Afghanistan.

Another key theme requiring discussion and consensus is the fight against Afghan drug trafficking. Our concern is understandable – Central Asia remains the principal transit corridor for the delivery of Afghan drugs to the CIS countries, primarily to Russia and further to Europe. Of interest is also a vision of the security situation in Central Asia and the Caucasus, along with new cooperation prospects in the Caspian and Black Sea regions in the framework of the EAPC agenda. We believe that the discussions will be able to help find new approaches in the consideration of these issues.

Italy is the G8 president this year. It proposes an agenda and various initiatives for consideration by the ministers and determines the range of countries, apart from the G8, to be invited to take part in the debate. I would like to note the very active and fruitful work of the Italian presidency and the fine interaction that has evolved between us and the Italian side on the entire range of G8-related issues.

An important step on this road was the UNSC ministerial meeting on the Middle East, held on May 11 at our initiative and under our chairmanship. We believe that its main outcome was a confirmation of the international legal framework for the peace process, above all the two-state principle, the implementation of which will lead to the creation of an independent and viable Palestinian state living side by side with Israel in peace and security.

We view the upcoming June 26 session of the Middle East Quartet on the sidelines of the G8 ministerial in Trieste, and its meeting with the LAS Contact Group along the lines of continuing these collective efforts.

Among the issues to be discussed in Trieste is, of course, the Arab peace initiative, which, as is known, was adopted at the pan-Arab summit in Beirut in 2002 and which speaks of normalizing Arab-Israeli relations in the event of Israel’s withdrawal from all the Arab territories occupied in 1967. We believe that this initiative, which is shared by virtually the entire Arab-Muslim world and actively supported by Russia, contains a significant potential that could, in the present conditions, be immensely useful. Our Quartet partners also adhere to this view.

Very important is the practical realization of the line declared by the new US administration, with emphasis on the priority of overcoming the long-standing Arab-Israeli confrontation and on the quest for a diplomatic solution to the conflict on the basis of dialogue, collective action, and the principle of a peaceful coexistence of two states – Israel and the future Palestinian one. All the steps going along the lines of the generally recognized international legal framework for a Middle East settlement to facilitate getting Arab-Israeli relations out of the deadlock will be welcomed by Russian diplomacy.

We offer our sincere condolences to the kith and kin of the dead. The practice of kidnapping people is categorically unacceptable. All the more so, the kidnapping and murder of the innocent people who had been engaged in a noble humane mission deserves strong condemnation. This runs counter to the customs, norms of morality and religious perceptions of all peoples.

We reiterate our solidarity with the efforts by the authorities of Yemen in counteraction against terrorism. It is necessary to step up the fight against this evil in all its forms and manifestations. Our cooperation with the Yemeni side is developing in this vein, and necessary additional measures are being undertaken to ensure the security of the Russian citizens who are currently in Yemen.

Given the new international legal and political realities in the region, resulting from the aggression of Georgia in August 2008, and the existing differences in the OSCE on that score, such work can be carried out on a status neutral basis and in close coordination with the receiving sides – Tbilisi and Tskhinval.

Unfortunately, the proposed draft decisions of the OSCE Permanent Council were not status neutral and proceeded from the territorial integrity of Georgia within its previous borders. We regret that the Russian amendments to these drafts of April 20 and May 12, aimed at correcting these shortcomings, were not adopted.

We also regret the decision of the Greek OSCE chairmanship of May 14 to suspend talks on the appropriate mandates. We believe a compromise decision on them is possible. Talks can be continued, and Russia stands ready to participate in them.

The period of activity of the OSCE observers in Georgia’s areas adjacent to South Ossetia expires on June 30. After this the OSCE is planning to wrap up its field activities in the region.

Despite this, we hope that the OSCE will not leave the region definitively. The possibilities remain for the work in Georgia of specialized institutions of the OSCE (the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, the Representative on Freedom of the Media and the High Commissioner on National Minorities), and for project activities under OSCE Secretariat auspices (the Economic Coordinator, the Police Unit, the Coordinator for Combating Human Trafficking, the Counterterrorism Division). We are certain that these entities are capable of contributing usefully to the provision of assistance to the governments of Georgia and South Ossetia.

We hope that sooner or later, in the OSCE, it will also prove possible to arrive at a decision acceptable to all on the resumption of its field activities in the region.

First of all, I would not interpret so straightforwardly the statement of the DPRK Foreign Ministry of June 13, 2009. Although such phrases are really present in it, their practical realization is conditioned by sufficiently serious circumstances.

In any event, of course, one can just profoundly deplore the fact that a UN member state demonstratively states its refusal to comply with the Security Council resolution which, I’ll recall, was adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and accordingly bears a binding character for all members of the United Nations.

It is also necessary to stress that resolution 1874 bears a well-considered and balanced character. Thanks largely to the efforts of Russia and China the sanction measures stipulated in it are to be applied exclusively under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the UN Charter which does not presuppose the use of military force. In addition, the resolution also contains a clear positive alternative, explicitly outlining the prospect of lifting the sanctions.

We hope that our DPRK partners will correctly perceive the will of the international community as expressed in the resolution and choose to take a politico-diplomatic path involving the quest for mutually acceptable solutions at Six-Party Talks, naturally, in the context of a continued denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula pursuant to the Joint Statement of September19, 2005 and relevant UNSC resolutions.

The sides continued agreeing initial data selection options for the calculation of the lengths of the coastlines of Russia and Ukraine in the Sea of Azov. This calculation will be accounted for in determining the boundary line between the two states in this area of water.

The delegations reiterated their positions on the settlement of issues relating to the Kerch Strait and on the delimitation of the territorial seas, the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zones of the Russian Federation and Ukraine in the Black Sea.

The next round of talks in the format of the sides’ delegations is scheduled for October 2009 in Kyiv.

We have repeatedly elucidated in our comments the problems of the basing of the Russian Federation Black Sea Fleet on the territory of Ukraine.

It will be recalled that on May 28, 1997 the appropriate agreements were signed in this connection: the Agreement on the Status and the Modalities of the Presence of the Russian Federation Black Sea Fleet on the Territory of Ukraine; the Agreement on the Perimeters for the Division of the Black Sea Fleet and the Agreement on Mutual Settlements Connected with the Division of the Black Sea Fleet and with the Presence of the Russian Federation Black Sea Fleet on the Territory of Ukraine, and then others as well.

Practical matters related to providing the necessary conditions for the full-fledged operation of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet and its presence on the territory of Ukraine are currently being dealt with between the Russian and Ukrainian sides. Work toward this end is being conducted in the framework of the relevant Sub-commission of the Russian-Ukrainian Interstate Commission. Its seventh meeting took place on June 10, 2009 in Kyiv and in our opinion passed successfully. No questions linked to the activities of the FSB members assigned to the Black Sea Fleet were discussed at the meeting.

Indeed, a number of Ukrainian officials have made statements recently on that score. There is an appropriate application. They are being examined.

However, we shall note that all units and services of the Black Sea Fleet are on the territory of Ukraine in accordance with the bilateral agreements. We presume that all the issues will be considered in the legal field and at the negotiating table.

Against this background, the peculiar treatment of the victory in World War II and of its price that sounded in nearly all the participants’ speeches did not escape our attention. The US president was the only one who mentioned “the Russians, who sustained some of the war's heaviest casualties on the Eastern front.” Sarkozy emphasized that “the Battle of Normandy decided the outcome of the war.” The British Prime Minister called June 6, 1944 “the day of triumph of good over evil… because Normandy is the only place where, after five years of total war and 40 million killed, Europe could be liberated.” The Canadian leader spoke of “the tide of war turned” and of even a “change in the course of history,” of the “rescue of humanity” and of the “start of the liberation of Europe and the rescue of civilization from fascism.”

Yet not a word was said about the decisive role in the Victory of the Soviet Union, which took the most terrible blow of Hitler’s army and sustained the heaviest human casualties.

The celebrations on the occasion of the 65th anniversary of the Allied landing at Normandy, and the liberation of Europe itself would have been impossible if millions of our soldiers had not paid for that with their blood and lives in the battles against the best units of Hitler’s Wehrmacht, if our army, in Churchill’s words, had not broken the backbone of Hitler’s military machine.

We do not intend to belittle the importance of the Battle of Normandy or question the bravery of the allies’ soldiers, but we insist on the correctness of the evaluations of the course of World War II and its outcomes.

Speakers included Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Alexander Yakovenko, who read out the message of greetings from the Minister, and senior officials from committees and commissions of the State Duma and the Federation Council and from Russian ministries, institutions and public organizations.

The meeting focused on what Rossotrudnichestvo was to do in the run-up to the Russian chairmanship of the CIS in 2010, and established a format of collaboration with bodies of state authority in humanitarian activities abroad. It also discussed new approaches toward achieving overall state goals, approved a vision of the Agency’s specific role in the integrative processes within the CIS space, and determined efforts for the consolidation of compatriots in the near and far abroad countries. Special attention in the Agency’s work was paid to the realization of Management by Objectives.

Considerable attention was paid to raising the effectiveness of the activity and expanding the network of the Agency’s overseas representations.

From answers to media queries:

How is the matter being tackled in connection with our request for the extradition of Yevgeny Chichvarkin?

I would like first of all to draw your attention to the fact that this person is on the international wanted list with the aim of arrest and extradition on serious charges: Yevgeny Chichvarkin is being charged under Article 126, Part 4, Item “a” (abduction of a person committed with the threat to use violence dangerous for life and health, out of selfish motives, by an organized group) and Article 163, Part 3, Items “a” and “b” (extortion, that is the demand for transfer of other people’s property or their right to property under threat of violence committed by an organized group in order to obtain property on a particularly large scale) of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation.

The Prosecutor General’s Office of the Russian Federation, as you know, has announced that having established the fact of Chichvarkin currently being on the territory of Britain, an appropriate request for the person’s extradition is being forwarded to London. The Russian side expects that on this request London will promptly take a positive decision.

How could you comment upon the NATO military exercise ‘Loyal Arrow 09’ held from June 8 to 18, 2009 in northern Sweden?

The Russian side took note of the holding of a large-scale NATO exercise in Sweden in June. Well of course each country has a sovereign right to independently take appropriate decisions. But the organization of NATO’s exercises on the territory of a country traditionally professing a policy of military nonalignment and freedom from military alliances cannot but cause questions.

You have mentioned that a treaty on strategic offensive arms will be discussed in the course of the upcoming talks between the Russian and US Presidents. Will the sides manage to complete its elaboration towards the Moscow Summit?

I can say that the talks in Geneva, which will take place at the end of this month, as I mentioned earlier, will make it possible to compare the positions ahead of the meeting of our two Presidents and to conclude what stage the sides have reached in solving this problem. In the course of the summit, when the experts will have reported to the Presidents on the emerging outline of that agreement, the situation will already start to clear up. Let us wait for the next round of talks in Geneva and then we will already be able to draw some conclusions. But it will be logical to draw the real conclusions after the experts’ report to the two Presidents during their upcoming meeting in Moscow on work done.

Nearly a year has passed since the August events in South Ossetia. But apart from Russia and Nicaragua no one else has recognized the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Is Russia’s leadership discussing with other countries the possibility of recognizing the independence of these states?

We have never asked anyone to recognize the independence of these two republics, since each state and the leadership of that state has a right to make up its mind on analogous problems independently. Therefore we proceed from the assumption that a revaluation by many states of the events of August 2008, and I mean the aggression of Georgia against South Ossetia, is nevertheless occurring at present. I think that when unambiguous conclusions are drawn, this will predetermine both the overall assessment of the situation in the region and accordingly the attitude to South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which have declared their independence as a result of the aggression.