Esteemed Madame Gottemoeller,

Esteemed Ladies and Gentlemen,

Colleagues and Friends,

The 200th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Russia and the US, like any anniversary, prompts one to turn to history. But I would like today to dwell not so much on history as on the present state of Russian-American relations, which instills concern in both countries, and then also in the world as a whole. Although of course history is important, primarily its lessons. Considering that in this hall there are no people indifferent to what is happening in relations between Russia and the US, I shall concentrate on what matters most.

Our countries and peoples have a different historical, spiritual and philosophical experience. Despite the fact that we are linked by at least the fact that both Russia and the US are multiethnic societies having taken in a diversity of cultures and traditions, we followed different paths towards the creation of national statehood. The differences in the geopolitical and strategic position left a substantial imprint on the formation of the long-term national interests of each of our countries.

Still, as we gradually “discovered” each other in the course of historical development, we found a good deal in common. We discovered that Russians and Americans have an identical striving towards freedom. Both nations turned out to be remarkable pioneers and discoverers in exploring vast new territories. Both demonstrated an enviable industriousness and business acumen. Both went through a destructive civil war and were able to heal their wounds. The ordeals that fell to our lot only strengthened our will and independent national spirit.

Perhaps not everyone remembers that a US national hero and a founder of the American Navy, Paul Jones, was no less than a real admiral in the Russian Navy and a comrade-in-arms of the great Russian military commander Alexander Suvorov in taking the Turkish fortress Ochakov in 1788. Incidentally, Jones even then put forward the idea of a joint fight against the prototype of “international terrorism” at sea, by suggesting cooperation against Turkish and North African pirates.

When the American colonies rose in revolt against Britain, Russia immediately came out in their support. Empress Catherine II not only refused the English king’s request to put down the rebellion, but also repeatedly in private letters voiced her belief in the rightness of the American colonies and predicted their victory. It came true. A similar situation recurred during the Civil War in America. Neither monarchic solidarity nor common values played any role in this regard. Basic national interests coincided, as was the case more than once later on.

Obviously disconsonant with this historical experience is the very raising of the issue of Russia’s containment in the contemporary conditions. We know that this voguish term of the past epoch has now reappeared in political science parlance. The raising of the “containment of Russia” issue suggests that for some people almost nothing has changed in the last fifteen years. In essence, it is proposed to extrapolate onto the entire present-day world the vision of the structure of international relations that formed up within the western alliance in the Cold War period.

But what can it all be about, this task of the containment of Russia in our time? The Russia, let me note, that has given up ideology, imperial and other “grand designs” in favor of pragmatism and common sense. In what respects to contain a country which has concentrated on its internal development and is doing this, without false modesty, quite successfully? Internal strengthening has naturally converted itself into a strengthening of our international standing. Russia pursues an external policy which is a continuation of its internal policy. We have realistic and understandable aims on the world scene, notably: to maintain international stability as a major condition of the accomplishment of the tasks of further development of our country and the natural evolution of international relations towards freedom and democracy.

If you analyze the ideological inertia that has led the US to a concept of “transformatory diplomacy,” a substantial gap emerges at the level of our foreign policy aspirations. Presumably herein lies the problem or, at least, a considerable part of it. Russia has more than a sufficient experience of revolutions: it took the entire twentieth century of our historical existence, a century which was a kind of purgatory for the whole European civilization as it was overcoming evil through exorcising its own ideological “demons” – all manner of extremist products of European liberal thought. That’s why today Russia, after all this past, will on no account subscribe to any new ideological project and even less so borrow such projects from the outside.

What is the meaning of containing a country which wants just a little, among other things to simply trade – an enterprise most of our partners have been engaged in for centuries and quite successfully at that? By realizing our natural competitive advantages, we build on investment in human resources and expand our capacity in transferring the economy onto the innovative path of development. Our economy is acquiring normal parameters: its growth rests in many respects on domestic consumer demand. We also fit into the general tendency of the appearance in new economies of transnational corporations that throw down a competitive challenge to the “old” TNCs.

Unlike the Soviet Union, Russia is an open country which is not going to shut itself off from anybody. So there is no need to “open” us either. It is not we who are today building walls, both physical (between and within countries) and political. We stand against artificial obstacles in international communication and for the removal of visa barriers, particularly in relations with the European Union. What can indeed give more reliable guarantees than this against the unpredictable development of this or that country? Russia is now a part of the universal consensus that democracy and market should form the basis of a sociopolitical system and economic life. There is no doubt that we are at the start of the road, and still far from the ideal. But the vector of development has been chosen and it has been chosen irrevocably.

They reproach Russia for its natural role in global energy. But energy dependence is a mutual dependence. On Russia’s initiative the G8 St. Petersburg Summit in July 2006 found a principled balance of interests of all the participants of energy markets. Like elsewhere in the world, energy is perceived in Russia as a strategic industry. Now – in particular, because we have to encounter a negative external reaction to the strengthening of the country and of its role in global politics. I shall underline what the President and Prime Minister and Government members have said more than once. Russia has not breached a single one of its obligations to the countries importing our energy carriers, nor a single contract for the supply of hydrocarbons.

In global energy there forms a new balance when states’ control over access to energy resources is counterbalanced by the concentration of advanced technologies in the hands of private transnational corporations. Is this not the conditions for equal cooperation based on the competitive advantages of each of the sides, united by the common aim of supplying the energy needs of the world economy?

Today global challenges and threats have moved into the foreground in world politics, that require a global response as well. That response can be found on lines of as broad international cooperation as possible. Let me note that under these conditions the traditional cumbersome “binding alliances,” as also “holy alliances” against somebody, do not solve present-day tasks. The diversity of interests and possibilities to participate in the appropriate international efforts has resulted in the development of network diplomacy – as an optimal vehicle for interaction of states in diverse bilateral and multilateral formats in the interest of tackling common tasks. Probably it is logical for diplomacy to master the network method, developed by private corporations and civil society.

By our estimates, the upper floor of the new international system is the emerging multipolarity. This objective reality is already difficult to question. And when President Putin spoke in Munich of a “unipolar world” having not materialized, he merely stated the obvious. We are convinced that building interstate relations along a hierarchical vertical is clearly unrealistic.

The new system of international relations is not anarchy or erratic “Brownian motion.” The presence in global politics of more than two key players inevitably dictates the need for collective action and requires an ability to come to an agreement. In multipolarity there is no confrontational predeterminedness. On the contrary, there is a stimulus towards searching for a stable balance of interests.

Today international relations have reached a boundary where – by virtue of the indivisibility of security and prosperity in the 21st century – a further delay in tackling the accumulated problems threatens grave consequences for all states.

Unfortunately, having inherited problems from the Cold War period, the international community has taken the path of creating new ones. The inertia of an ideologically motivated unilateral response has caught its “second wind” in our days. As a result we see “broken kitchenware” lying all around – the dead-end situations that can’t be resolved in the framework of previous approaches.

Let us acknowledge that you can’t lay in security, once and for all – it is a living process revealing the meaning of the truth about “our daily bread,” as applied to international relations. Only normal relations and cooperation with all states, including “problem” or, as they often say, rogue states and their involvement in dialogue can ensure real security now and for the foreseeable future. This, I shall stress, is not a one-off action. It requires constant, daily and collective effort.

The problem of overcoming the Cold War legacy is particularly acute in Europe. Bloc policy, based on the logic of containment, dominated here for too long. Even now one has to encounter what it is hard to perceive as anything other than attempts to recreate a cordon sanitaire to the west of Russia’s borders. Favoritism in this part of Europe gives rise to an unhealthy atmosphere. Nationalist sentiments receive encouragement that are fraught with the main threat to the continent’s unity.

It is my belief that current problems of the European Union and European politics as a whole cannot be solved without due consideration for US interests, nor outside a constructive and forward-looking relationship with Russia, based on mutual trust.

Instead of this some people continue to try to contain Russia in one way or another. It is along these lines that we regard the decision to expand NATO as breaching the assurances previously given to Moscow that this would not happen. Now they justify the continued pursuit of a line on expanding NATO by the need to “spread democracy.”

The thesis of NATO membership serving as a kind of “pass” to the club of democratic states is now being proclaimed for countries in the CIS space already. Although the applied criterion of the readiness of a particular country for a “democracy test” is only one: it is readiness to tow behind other people’s policy.

As to the CIS, no one has any doubt that Russia possesses the main resources for maintaining socioeconomic and other stability here. Moscow’s renunciation of politicized trade-and-economic relations and switchover to market principles – what other more convincing proof can we provide to confirm our resolve to ensure normal interstate relations in this space? Inside our country we even face the accusation that, by moving to market prices, Russia has pushed away neighbors from itself, only to be “picked up” by other big countries. Against this background, we continue to be criticized for “Russian diktat,” which this process allegedly proves. A paradox.

There exist all the conditions for cooperation between Russia and the West in this region, but, of course, the kind of cooperation that is equal and respectful, particularly in regard to the CIS countries themselves, which need help with the final rise of their statehood, not being made hostage to the notorious geopolitical “zero sum game.”

The unilateral plans to deploy a US missile defense base in Europe also fit into the “containment of Russia” mentality. I do not think that there is anything fortuitous about the fact that the proposed missile defense base in Europe smoothly – as a missing chip in a jigsaw puzzle – falls into the pattern of a US global missile defense system located, by accident or not, along the perimeter of Russian boundaries. Of course, we must take this into account, as Russian President Putin said, who has spoken in a very thorough fashion on this theme more than once. This is not even politics, it is almost arithmetic. It goes without saying, our response to this strategic challenge will also be on a strategic level. But we would prefer joint work, which President Putin offered at his meeting with President Bush in Heiligendamm. A collective project involving all concerned countries, primarily the European nations, and using Gabala Radar Station in Azerbaijan with consent from its leadership would render this US project for a third missile defense position area, which is sufficiently contradictory and fraught with an undermining of strategic stability, unnecessary. I know that there are quite a few people in Europe who are correctly worried that the deployment of elements of the US national defense system in Europe will have adverse implications for global disarmament processes as well.

The striving to contain Russia is also visible in the situation surrounding the CFE Treaty. We approach this Treaty with the utmost honesty and lay claims only to what it was concluded for – to equal security. The problem is that the principle of equal security was undermined with the dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty Organization while at the same time preserving and expanding NATO contrary to, as I have already said, the promises made to us on oath. And attempts to rectify the situation around the CFE Treaty have run into the categorical refusal of the NATO members to ratify the Agreement on the Adaptation of the CFE Treaty to the new conditions under the pretexts whose juridical invalidity is obvious to everyone who has read both the Treaty itself and the other documents of the 1999 Istanbul Conference, which were really adopted at one meeting but have no bearing on the Treaty. Everything needed for ratification of the Treaty and its entry into force in the adapted form is enumerated in the text of the Agreement on Adaptation itself. By the way, my American colleagues, when we were talking on this theme, to the question why they were trying to think up a juridical linkage between ratification of the Treaty on Adaptation and the Istanbul commitments concerning Georgia, Moldova and other things, said: “There is no juridical linkage; the linkage is political.” This is an honest answer, but, of course, unacceptable.

Unfortunately, the extraordinary conference in Vienna that was convened at Russia’s initiative in accordance with the Treaty itself came to nothing. This entire situation suggests an attempt to reproduce bloc instincts and approaches and return to the “zero sum game” logic. The state of affairs with the CFE Treaty is a vivid example of the fact that any element of a global or European security architecture that does not rest on the principles of equality and mutual benefit cannot be sustainable. We have reported the outcome of the extraordinary conference to the President. You know the sequence of actions which the President himself put forward in his message to the Russian Federal Assembly in order to save the Treaty. If our partners do not have readiness for this, then that’s what we will do, the President said. I shall only note that this situation should by no means be seen as Russia’s withdrawal from discussion on arms control problems. On the initiative of Russia, France and Germany a special session of the OSCE Forum for Security Cooperation will take place in October this year to examine the question of strengthening confidence-building measures and arms control. I am convinced that a broader discussion needs to be held than merely continuing the exchange of arguments around the dying CFE Treaty. But we, I assure you, do not want to bury it. The door will remain open. And as soon as the Treaty is ratified by our partners from the NATO countries, we will, of course, honor our obligations in line with the Agreement on the Adaptation of the CFE Treaty, which Russia has already ratified.

It is deplorable that even in such an utterly clear and sacred matter as the necessity of preventing a revival of neonazi tendencies and outrages upon the memory of the vanquishers of fascism the position of certain of our western partners is formed under the influence of the very same desire to “contain” Russia. I will not even dwell on this in detail. It’s incomprehensible.

The route to trust runs through frank discussions as well as interaction presupposing cooperation from the outset, beginning with a joint analysis of the threats. It is in regard to this last point that they keep refusing Russia without any intelligible reason.

Speaking in Munich, President Putin invited all our partners to a serious, well-argued discussion on the situation, far from satisfactory, that has evolved in international relations. We are convinced that gone is the time of a dual attitude towards Russia as a partner and as an opponent simultaneously. There can be no solving the problem of trust on these lines, and so of cooperation as well. If some people intend “to give rebuff to the negative behavior of Russia,” then what is the basis for a simultaneous expectation of our cooperation in matters of concern to those wishing to “rebuff us”? It is necessary to choose between containment and cooperation. Particularly in such questions as Russia’s entry into the WTO or the Jackson-Vanik amendment, the grounds for whose preservation disappeared at the end of the 80s of the last century and which haven’t we got promises to abolish from all kinds of people. At the highest level and in the Administration and in Congress and in US Jewish communities.

In the conditions of the globalization of security challenges and threats there is a great difference between cooperation and its absence, between a collective mode of action and the need for each state or group of states to act at their own risk. We exercise our share of responsibility – no one will do it for us. We have no syndrome of exclusiveness, but neither are there any reason to consider our analysis and our ideas worse than those of other people. Cooperation with Russia is only possible on the basis of full equality, respect for the security interests of each other and mutual benefit.

The powerful factor of a close and honest working relationship between Presidents Putin and Bush operates in Russian-American relations so far. If an equal partnership prevails in these relations, then I believe there will be little that our countries could not accomplish. What ought to be prevented is making Russian-American relations hostage to electoral cycles of the two countries – or, even worse, allowing outsiders to do that. This would signify “washing our hands” of the vitally important interests of our peoples and the interests of global stability.

The struggle against international terrorism, organized crime and drug trafficking, the search for realistic, universally acceptable ways of climate protection, nuclear energy development while reinforcing the nonproliferation regime, the ensuring of global energy security, space exploration and many other things – is it worth sacrificing all the areas of the already-evolving practical cooperation on the altar of the politics of containment?

We concur with the US that nuclear weapons should not be allowed to spread, first and foremost in the Near and Middle East and on the Korean Peninsula. In the last few years we have together with the United States been actively working on the implementation of the joint initiative for preventing acts of nuclear terrorism, with which our Presidents came up at last year’s G8 Summit in St. Petersburg. The number of its participants already exceeds 50 countries.

Let us be utterly frank. The main thing is that the US and Russia should perceive each other as equal partners. A format other than this is unacceptable to us today. You will agree, it’s paradoxical and simultaneously tragic that we understood and, I will say it straight, respected each other and the interests of each other more in the years of the Cold War and detente. This is the positive part of the Cold War legacy that is in demand in our time. Only then it was respect on a negative basis. Why can’t the same be done on a positive basis today?

Therefore, apparently, it is logical to turn to the experience of the statesmen in both countries who were in power at the time. I see in this the meaning of the creation of the Russian-American public dialogue “Russia-USA: A Look into the Future” under the chairmanship of Yevgeny Primakov and Henry Kissinger, which is due to gather for its first meeting in Moscow this upcoming July. Presidents Putin and Bush gave vigorous backing to this useful initiative. We expect it to become a contribution to the construction of partner and equal relations.

Russia does not try to wangle an equal partnership. It is not anti-Americanism. In Russia there are no such widespread anti-American sentiments as in other countries. And if you recall George Kennan, we would like his Long Telegram not only to be currently referred to, but also his advice to be taken on how the outside world should behave in its relations with Russia in its post-Soviet period of development. He thought of that and gave the advice to have dealings with post-Soviet Russia without mentoring and without foisting one’s views onto it.

No one is against the leadership of any key world power if it is ready and able for it. The thing is that the leadership formula itself has changed under today’s conditions. I agree with Kissinger that the US could be the “first among equals” in a new geopolitical lineup. But this means to know how to listen to partners, engage in well-argued discussions with them, and not reject wittingly their intellectual contribution to the common cause. In the final analysis, such leadership must be an organic part of “teamwork” that presupposes an ability not to dictate one’s will, but to reduce the interests and views of all members of the team to a common denominator. Strictly speaking, that’s what was behind the “revolt” among leading states of the world when the situation around Iraq was evolving. Moreover, the disagreements did not run along the lines which had divided us during the Cold War period; the basic interests of Russia, China, France and Germany simply coincided. This is just an interesting moment which should be borne in mind. Generally speaking, it is important to know how to give up illusions in time.

It would be justified to speak of collective leadership in the contemporary world. An important element of this process, which is taking shape, is the Group of Eight and other formats. In this context it is difficult to overestimate the importance of reaching consensus on principled issues in world politics between Russia, the US and the European Union. I can only agree with Jacques Delor who believes that “future development must lead to reaching an all-embracing agreement” in the framework of this trio. The former president of the Commission of the European Communities is absolutely right in that “Russia, the EU and America are three political forces which have got used to discussing with each other,” and that “every time they become divided by disagreements, when each party starts playing its own game, the risk of global instability increases dramatically.”

It would be sad if unnecessary haste in questions which wait and can wait provoked alienation between Russia and the US and our peoples looked upon each other as detached observers. I would like to hope that the talks of the Russian and US presidents in Kennebankport will help to remove these risks and realize the possibilities of partnership without detriment to the dignity of both sides – whether on the problem of missile defense, on Kosovo, on strategic offensive arms or on any other issues on which global stability depends.

I think that our peoples have not lost their ability to surprise the world. Why not try and do it together? For diversity’s sake? Especially as everyone will have to “stew” in global economy and politics where it is becoming an ever more “crowded place.” So why not be together and act in a spirit of cooperation and healthy, honest competition on the basis of uniform standards and respect for international law? We have nothing to share, except our common responsibility with other partners for the destinies of the world. In the same way we could “contain” those who try to deprive the contemporary world of the benefits which the Russian-American, and then also Euro-Atlantic partnership as a whole carries with it.

Speaking of the Carnegie Foundation I would like to cite some conclusions which the authors of a joint study: Russian-American Relations: The Case for an Upgrade – Russian political scientists Dmitri Trenin, Vyacheslav Nikonov and the predecessor of Rose Gottemoeller at the post of Director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, Andrew Kuchins – have drawn. In particular, their advice is that Russia and the US, if they want to derive maximum benefit from bilateral relations should focus on what is really achievable in the near future and desirable in a longer term. And they propose that Russia and the US be seen “as they are” and in terms of what they will become in the near and medium term. “Russia and the United States,” they conclude, “can surely proceed without a solid partnership with the other; but a strong partnership would help them achieve their national goals more fully, and sooner.” And cheaper, I will add.

In conclusion I want to wish the participants of the present seminar great success in their activities for the benefit of stronger Russian-American relations.

Question: You have said that our countries have good projects for joint work in the field of nonproliferation, the atomic sphere and ecology. But in your speech there was no mention that the US is a leading world economy and that our trade turnover is small. You as a politician understand that politics is under the pressure of business, that is an increase of the trade turnover between Russia and the US could help improve our relations and make them partner ties? What dynamics are possible, in your opinion?

Foreign Minister Lavrov: I fully agree with you. We are interested in this, and so are US companies. The latest agreements involving leading US firms and corporations, particularly during the St. Petersburg Economic Forum, clearly show that we are moving towards more profound, not only commercial, but, above all, investment interaction. Yes, I fully agree that the more solid is the foundation, the fewer are problems in political relations. The example of US-Chinese relations is there for all to see.

Question: In your remarks you have mentioned that Russia will not accept any ideology, primarily from the outside. Is there any ideology that attempts are being made to impose it? Could you dwell in greater detail on the ideological line which you think poses a danger?

Foreign Minister Lavrov: It is any attempt to bring ideology in its classical meaning into international relations. Life probably should have taught us something. There were ideologies which brought nobody any joy in the 20th century, but, on the contrary, caused heaps of suffering. If Trotsky was famous for his ideological attempt to remake the world after his own pattern, there are present-day ideologists who want to remake today’s world after their own patterns for ideological reasons. The significance of the values of one civilization is being offered as a universal criterion for all cooperation. But if we live in a competitive world, then our values too are an object of competition. Let us talk about the values of Christian civilization and all its branches, Islam, Judaism and Buddhism. This is also a problem. You know how sharply the calls on us to change our morality and take a course towards all-permissiveness are being discussed in our society. This a radical, extremist, boundless, unlimited interpretation of the principles of personal freedom. But rights and duties always go hand in hand. Well, in the case of Russian society – it is also some moral foundations.

Question: If the US does not agree to use Gabala Radar Station, what will Russia do?

Foreign Minister Lavrov: Well, then we will simply become even firmer in our view that the talk really is not about threats from Iran when a third position area is being set up in Europe.